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WHEN NOT TO ASK: A DEFENSE OF
CHOICE-MASKING NUDGES IN
MEDICAL RESEARCH
SUSANNA MCGREW*, SARAH RASKOFF**, AND BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN***
ABSTRACT
In this article, we examine the legality and ethics of a controversial but
widespread practice in clinical research: choice-masking nudges. A choicemasking nudge (CMN) exists when a research team explicitly obscures a
meaningful choice from participants by presenting a default decision as the
standard way forward. Even though an easy-to-use opt-out mechanism is
available for participants who independently express concerns with the standard
default, the fact that a default has been pre-selected is not made obvious to
research participants. To opt out of the nudge, a participant must overtly request
non-standard treatment. We argue that use of such nudges in medical research
can be justified by their individual, collective, and social benefits, provided
that they respect autonomy and satisfy four additional acceptability conditions.
In Part II of this Article, we describe three controversial cases of CMNs in
medical research. In Part III, we provide background on nudging and explain
how our proposed CMNs fit into the existing literature on nudging and libertarian
paternalism. In Part IV, we explain how the reasonable person standard
as employed by United States research regulations can be used to support CMNs.
In Part V, we anticipate some of the strongest objections to CMNs by explaining
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how CMNs are compatible with a wide range of plausible accounts of autonomy.
Finally, in Part VI, we discuss four additional core considerations an acceptable
CMN must meet: legitimate policy goals; benefits outweighing harms; burdens
distributed fairly; and absence of ethically superior feasible alternatives. We also
revisit and analyze the three existing controversies previously explored in Part
II and show how each would benefit from the conceptual clarity offered by
our analytic framework. Medical research is complicated and can be difficult for
participants to understand. Thoughtfully designed CMNs can play an important
role in gently guiding large numbers of research participants toward decision
outcomes that really are best for them and their communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses specifically on nudging participants in medical research.
Nudges are ubiquitous; they come from our smartphones and our employers,1
regarding things as different as food choice2 and energy consumption.3
Regardless of the source, however, all nudges attempt to influence nudgees’
choices by changing the way options are presented.4 Although nudging is all
around us and even permeates medical care,5 its use in medical research prompts
unique ethical and regulatory concerns. For instance, beyond the way researchers
present information about costs and benefits, may they go so far as to implement
default choices that participants would have to actively opt-out of to avoid? More
concretely, may we nudge participants towards receiving medically actionable
information they might not ask for? May we nudge new parents towards
contributing their newborn infant’s blood spot for future research use? May we
nudge participants to deposit their research data in repositories where other
investigators can access them to help answer a broad range of secondary
scientific questions? We argue that as long as certain acceptability considerations
are satisfied, nudges that mask choices regarding those questions can be ethically
and legally acceptable.
A choice-masking nudge (CMN) is a particular kind of nudge that exists in
medical research when a research team explicitly obscures a meaningful choice
from participants by presenting a default decision as the standard way forward.
Even though an easy-to-use opt-out mechanism is available for participants who
independently express concerns with the standard default, the fact that a default
has been pre-selected is not made obvious to research participants. Consider, for
example, a consent form stating that secondary genetic findings may be returned
to research participants (and explaining what that means) without providing the
participant with an opportunity to explicitly consent.6 In that case, the form does
not advertise the fact that receiving secondary findings has been deliberately preselected. To opt out of the nudge, a participant would need to ask the researchers
to receive non-standard treatment—in this case, to not receive any secondary
genetic findings. Since all CMNs must give nudgees a fair chance of opting out,
1. See, e.g., RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
(2008) (showing that automatic enrollment is a nudge that employers can
use to increase employee participation in employer sponsored retirement plans).
2. Id. at 2.
3. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Todd Rogers, The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Behavioral
Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation 104 AM. ECON. REV. 3003 (2014)
(showing how consumers respond to home energy reports designed to reduce energy use when these
reports are repeatedly mailed to their home).
4. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
5. See, e.g., Bart Engelen, Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: A Case-by-Case Analysis,
19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 48, 48 (2019) (discussing nudging in clinical care).
6. See infra Part II.A (providing an overview on the debate over return of genetic results).
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 109
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nudgees should be made aware (at least in general terms) that some options may
have been pre-selected as defaults and that they may choose to select a different
option. Consent forms could include a disclaimer suggesting that participants
who think they might prefer a different treatment than the one indicated should
raise any concerns with the research team (for example, “please ask a member of
the research team if you have any questions or concerns about automatic return
of secondary findings”). This kind of general disclaimer is not expected to
significantly reduce the efficacy of the CMNs; on the contrary, research in other
contexts has shown that informing individuals that they are being nudged does
not tend to reduce the nudge’s effectiveness.7
There are four elements of CMNs that are worth emphasizing. First,
researchers are prohibited from masking information regarding the default
choice.8 Researchers avoid masking such information when the issue in question
and the default action are clearly described, but the choice regarding the default
action is masked by not presenting an opportunity to make an explicit choice.9
Second, because CMNs are not binding, participation in research does not
depend on agreeing to the default action.10 Third, the CMN must be easy to
resist.11 That means that the opt-out mechanism to pursue an alternative to the
default action must be easy to use after the participant self-identifies a concern.12
And fourth, CMNs must include meaningful choices—either because they are
likely to have non-trivial impact, or because a sizable number of participants are
expected to have strong preferences about them (in contrast to the mundane
choices that are routinely hidden from research participants, such as the method
of contact with the research team). Ideally, CMNs will have the greatest effect
on research participants who do not have strong prior preferences about the
choice that is masked, since those who do have strong preferences are more likely
to notice and opt out of the nudge.13 While we offer a variety of relevant
considerations for analyzing the ethical acceptability of a CMN within a broad,

7. See George Loewenstein et al., Warning: You Are about to be Nudged, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y
35, 36 (2015) (comparing nudges to the more forceful alternative of authorized deception in medical
research); see also Frank Miller et al., Deception in Research on the Placebo Effect, 2 PLOS MED. 853,
854 (2005) (comparing double blind placebo tests to investigations where the investigator intentionally
withholds information from the participant).
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV. In practice, nudges are likely to have a strong impact on individuals who have
low literacy, feel highly deferential to medical expertise, or more generally feel unempowered in the
medical system, even if they have strong preferences. See infra Part IV. As we discuss later, researchers
should take those consideration into consideration when designing nudges and attempt to mitigate their
effects. See infra Part IV.
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flexible framework, this paper does not provide an algorithmic account of how
these various considerations weigh against each other in every circumstance.
The following examples of CMNs are all controversial and likely to meet
serious opposition, stemming from a few ethical concerns. First, the perceived
primacy of autonomy in the bioethics literature may lead critics to claim that our
analysis of CMNs gives short shrift to that principle, particularly regarding the
autonomy interests of individuals who would prefer not to be nudged.
Bioethicists commonly identify four primary moral principles: autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.14 Autonomy, however, is often treated
as first among equals, and any perceived infringement of a research participant’s
autonomy is taken very seriously.15 In this paper, we push back against the idea
that autonomy should be the foremost ethical concern when analyzing the
appropriateness of CMNs. While autonomy is relevant and constrains the scope
of acceptable CMNs, considerations of individual, collective, and societal benefit
are also crucial to our ethical analyses (and may not always align with maximally
promoting autonomy).
Second is the related issue of dealing with the tail of the curve. In most
research cohorts, there will be a small group of participants who have outlier
views or preferences.16 Respecting these differences to help this small group
make more informed decisions could impact the larger research cohort, or even
the research enterprise as a whole. In cases where nudges cannot be feasibly
tailored to individuals, heterogeneity among participants makes it unlikely that
all nudgees will benefit from or even be equally affected by the nudge.
Third, regulatory opposition will likely come from the perception that
CMNs cut against the large body of jurisprudence that emphasizes informed
consent in medical research. However, while the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects (the revised Common Rule) explicitly mandates
disclosure of relevant information and an opportunity to discuss it, it does not
mention active solicitation of preferences.17 Instead, our justification for CMNs
14. TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 13 (8th ed., 2019).
15. See Raanan Gillon, Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for
Autonomy Should Be “First Among Equals,” 29 J. MED. ETHICS 307, 307 (2003) (arguing that autonomy
should be the first principle among ethical principles because autonomy is contained within the other three
principles); CHARLES FOSTER, CHOOSING LIFE, CHOOSING DEATH: THE TYRANNY OF AUTONOMY IN
MEDICAL ETHICS AND LAW (2009).
16. Ceyda Özhan Çaparlar & Aslı Dönmez, What is Scientific Research and How Can it be Done?,
44 TURKISH J. OF ANAESTHESIOL REANIMATION 212, 216 (2016).
17. 45 C.F.R §46.116 (a)(4) (2019) (“The prospective subject or the legally authorized representative
must be provided with the information that a reasonable person would want to have in order to make an
informed decision about whether to participate, and an opportunity to discuss that information.”); Cf.
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, GUIDANCE ON BROAD
CONSENT UNDER THE REVISED COMMON RULE 12 (2017) (explaining that Official guidance on broad
consent under the revised Common Rule allows research participants to authorize unspecified future uses
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invokes the reasonable person standard, which has often been interpreted to
require preference solicitation.18
In this paper, we draw a distinction between nudges with implications for
information use (informational nudges) and nudges with direct physical implications
(physical nudges). The former concerns actions regarding the treatment of
information gained from research, while the latter have to do directly with physical
procedures that have significant implications for bodily integrity.19 Thus, a nudge
concerning drawing a blood sample for clinical care would be physical, while a
nudge concerning what is to be done with what remains of the leftover sample would
be informational. We claim that it is reasonable to not explicitly solicit consent for
aspects of research with predominantly informational implications, provided that
there is sufficient information disclosure, that our other acceptability considerations
are met, and that doing so is consistent with current United States research
regulations.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In Part II, we present
three cases of medical research decisions where CMNs could be implemented. In
Part III, we provide background on nudging and explain how our proposed choicemasking nudges fit into the large existing literature on nudging and libertarian
paternalism.20 In Part IV, we explain how the reasonable person standard as
employed by United States research regulations can be used to support CMNs.21 In
Part V, we anticipate some of the strongest objections to CMNs by discussing
prominent features of various views of autonomy, and explaining how CMNs are
compatible with a wide range of plausible accounts of autonomy.22 Finally, in Part
VI, we lay out four core considerations relevant to the acceptability of CMNs:
legitimate policy goals; benefits outweighing harms; burdens distributed fairly; and
absence of ethically superior feasible alternatives.23 We also revisit and analyze the
three cases presented in Part II, in light of those considerations. A CMN that respects
autonomy and that satisfies the considerations relevant to acceptability, we argue,
can plausibly be justified on the basis of individual, collective, or social benefit.24
of their research data without preference solicitation about each one). Our focus here is on the text of the
revised Common Rule, which appears to pose a greater legal challenge to CMNs than the more permissive
guidance. Attachment C to Letter from Stephen Rosenfield, Secr’y’s Advisory Comm. on Hum. Rsch.
Protections Chair, to Thomas Price, Sec’y of Health and Hum. Serv. (Aug. 2, 2017) (available at
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/attachment-c-august-2-2017/index.html).
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. Even informational nudges may have downstream
physical consequences, such as information about genetic risks leading someone to seek preventative care.
Id. But that level of interaction between the informational and physical does diminish the intuitive
distinction between nudges that are primarily informational and primarily physical. Id.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. See infra Part VII.
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II. THREE CASES OF CHOICE-MASKING NUDGES IN RESEARCH
A. The Right Not to Know Genetic Information About Oneself
In the past fifteen years, advances in genomic sequencing technology have
given us the capacity to rapidly and inexpensively sequence a person’s entire
genome.25 Physicians and researchers quickly began incorporating this powerful
tool into their arsenal.26 While next-generation sequencing has radically changed
how science is conducted, researchers and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
have struggled with the ethical implications of this new technology.27 In
particular, given that massive amounts of data generated by genomic sequencing
can contain clinically actionable findings unrelated to the specific condition
being investigated, the research community has vigorously debated about
whether and how to honor participants’ so-called right not to know (RNTK)
genetic information about themselves.28
For illustration, imagine IRB deliberations regarding whether to ask
participants if they want to learn about any heightened cancer susceptibility that
their sequence data could reveal. There are two options, both of which involve
accepting that a mistake will be made. If an IRB requires investigators to actively
solicit preferences, it is almost certain that some people will choose not to receive
25. See Eric D. Green, Strategic Vision for Improving Human Health at the Forefront of Genomics,
586 NATURE 683, 683 (2020) (explaining the significant advances made in the development of human
genome sequencing technology); see also, Nat’l Hum. Genome Rsch. Inst., The Cost of Sequencing a
Human Genome, GENOME.GOV (July 26, 2020), https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/factsheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost (demonstrating that the cost of sequencing a genome has
dropped from over $10 million to less than $1,000 over the past two decades).
26. Teri A. Manolio et al., Opportunities, Resources, and Techniques for Implementing Genomics in
Clinical Care, 394 LANCET 511, 511 (2019).
27. See, e.g., Amy L. McGuire et al., Research Ethics and the Challenges of Whole Genome
Sequencing, 9 NATURE REV. GENETICS 152, 152 (2008) (describing the major ethical considerations raised
by new genomic sequencing technologies).
28. Benjamin E. Berkman, Refuting the Right Not to Know, 19 J. HEALTH. CARE L. POL’Y 1, 6 (2017).
Early in the adoption of genetic testing (circa 2000), there was substantial debate about a patient’s right
not to know genetic information about themselves. Id. at 9. A few scholars took an absolutist position,
arguing that the right not to know information about oneself was sacrosanct. See, e.g., Roberto Andorno,
The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED ETHICS 435, 436–37 (2004) (arguing
that the right not to know is based in psychological spatial privacy which safeguards one’s sense of self).
Other scholars saw freedom from unwanted genetic information as an important, but defeasible right that
needed to be balanced against other considerations. See, e.g., Graeme Laurie, Recognizing the Right Not
to Know: Conceptual, Professional, and Legal Implications, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 53, 58–59 (2014) (arguing
that the right to refuse genetic information must be balanced with public health concerns, economic costs,
and the public health burdens that one’s disease may impose if information is withheld for the sake of
preserving autonomy); Jonathan Herring & Charles Foster, “Please Don’t Tell Me”, 21 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 20 (2012). Other scholars took an even more skeptical view of the RNTK, arguing
that blinding oneself to important information actually restricts autonomy. See, e.g., Rosamond Rhodes,
Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic
Knowledge, 23 J. MED. AND PHIL. 11, 15–18 (1998). This initial debate was limited, however, by the
relatively narrow scope of the nascent genetic medicine field. Id.
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their cancer predisposition information without fully understanding the
implications of this choice. Perhaps subjects will make this choice because they
do not understand the nature of the information they are refusing and/or because
they fear the anxiety associated with confronting bad news. Whatever the reason,
soliciting preferences means accepting that some people will not gain access to
potentially life-saving treatment that they would have actually wanted had they
been fully informed.29 In contrast, if investigators do not actively solicit
preferences, some people could be forced to confront the fact that they might
battle cancer in the future, even though they would have legitimately preferred
not to know this fact.30
Rightly sensing a need for professional ethical guidance, the American
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) published
recommendations suggesting that there is an obligation to look for secondary
findings, and that those findings be routinely returned without soliciting a
patient’s preference for knowing or not knowing that information.31 These
recommendations sparked an extended heated debate about the importance of the
RNTK,32 eventually prompting the ACMG to revise their guidance to specify
that patients must be given an opportunity to opt-out of receiving genetic
information.33 This RNTK debate was particularly heated in the research context,
where open questions about the scope of an investigator’s clinical responsibilities
towards their research subjects persist.
B. Newborn Blood Spot Research
A day or so after birth, a nurse will approach new parents about obtaining
a tiny blood sample (typically from a heel stick) that can screen their newborn

29. See Will Schupmann et al., Exploring the Motivations of Research Participants Who Choose Not
to Learn Medically Actionable Secondary Genetic Findings about Themselves, GENETICS IN MED. 1, 3
(2021) (demonstrating that about half of initial refusers change their minds (“reversible refusers”) while
the other half maintain their initial decision not to know (“persistent refusers”)).
30. Id. at 4.
31. Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical
Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETIC MED. 566, 568 (2013). Robert C. Green et al., ACMG
Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15
GENETIC MED. 565 (2013).
32. See Berkman, supra note 28, at 12–21 (summarizing the heated debate about the RNTK prompted
by the ACMG recommendations); Meredith Waldman, Controversy Flares Over Informing Research
Subjects about ‘Incidental’ Genetic Findings, SCIENCE (Aug. 2, 2021, 4:45PM),
https://www.science.org/content/article/controversy-flares-over-informing-research-subjects-aboutincidental-genetic-findings (showing that the heated dispute over the need to ask participants about the
RNTK remains active and unresolved).
33. AM. COLL. OF MED. GENETICS AND GENOMICS, ACMG Policy Statement: Updated
Recommendations Regarding Analysis and Reporting of Secondary Findings in Clinical Genome-scale
Sequencing, 17 GENETIC MED. 68, 68 (2015).
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infant for a range of conditions that generally require early intervention.34 While
newborn screening is an important public health activity, the samples can also be
extremely valuable from a medical research standpoint.35 Since these newborn
bloodspots (NBS) are taken from almost all newborns, they provide an
opportunity to generate population-level data about public health questions and
can be vital for ascertaining rare disease cases in sufficient numbers to conduct
rigorous research.36 NBSs are also uniquely useful in epidemiological research,
particularly relating to infectious diseases and environmental exposures.37
Traditionally, because these bloodspots are deidentified, research activities were
not considered to be human subjects research under the Common Rule.38 Thus,
researchers have generally been allowed access to the samples without explicit
informed consent. In the hours before being discharged from the hospital, new
parents are generally given a brochure (along with a stack of other forms and
pamphlets) that explains how the NBS research program works and provides
information about the mechanism parents can use to opt-out.39 One can
reasonably question whether new parents have the cognitive capacity to fully
engage with this kind of abstract question, buried in an avalanche of other more
urgently important information, in the disorienting few days after delivery.
It is not surprising then that scholars and advocates have raised multiple
concerns about the research use of NBS samples even though they hold
significant scientific value. The primary argument is that it is unethical (and
deceptive) to store samples for future research use without first having obtained
explicit consent to do so.40 There are concerns about tangible harms flowing from
the use of these samples41 and about non-welfare harms (such as using samples
34. See Michelle H. Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention and Use of Residual Newborn
Screening Blood Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703, 706–707 (2011) (demonstrating that most states do not
require prenatal disclosure of information about research uses of newborn blood spots).
35. STEVE OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN USING
RESIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 9–15 (The Nat’l Academies
Press, 2010).
36. Michelle J. Bayefsky et al., Parental Consent for the Use of Residual Newborn Screening
Bloodspots: Respecting Individual Liberty vs Ensuring Public Health, 314 JAMA 21, 22 (2015).
37. Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Retention and Research Use of Residual Newborn Screening Bloodspots,
131 PEDIATRICS 120, 121 (2013) [hereinafter Botkin I].
38. Marianna J. Bledsoe & William E. Grizzle, Use of human specimens in research: the evolving
United States regulatory, policy, and scientific landscape, 19 DIAGNOSTIC HISTOPATHOLOGY 322, 335–
36 (2013).
39. See Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Prenatal Education of Parents about Newborn Screening and
Residual Dried Blood Spots, 170 JAMA PEDIATRICS 543, 544 (2016) [hereinafter Botkin II] (arguing that
“the hectic postpartum environment and the need to address other health care priorities in newborn and
maternal care contribute to the poor efficacy for current educational approaches”).
40. Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Science Gold Mine, Ethical Minefield, 324 SCIENCE, April 10, 2009, at
166.
41. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 35, at 19–29.
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to conduct controversial research that the source of the sample would not want
to support).42 These concerns have led to a number of high-profile court cases,
where parents have successfully challenged NBS research programs that do not
actively solicit consent.43
The desire to obtain consent is understandable, but researchers have voiced
concerns that imposing such a requirement would reduce participation rates, thus
undermining the value of a resource as a broad representation of the population.44
This has led professional societies and policymakers to issue a range of guidance
positions. The American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG), in a 2015 update
of their guidance on pediatric genetic testing, advocated for parents to be given
a choice about future research use of NBS samples.45 Even more radically, the
ACMG and the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) jointly argued for the
necessity of consent before any newborn screening (let alone research) is
conducted. The AAP did, however, remain flexible about the form that the
consent process can take.46 Other groups remain equivocal,47 argue in favor of
the status quo,48 or endorse the acceptability of an opt-out approach.49

42. Raymond D. De Vries et al., The Moral Concerns of Biobank Donors: The Effect of Non-welfare
Interests on Willingness to Donate, 12 LIFE SCI. SOC’Y & POL’Y 1, 2 (2016).
43. See Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB, 2009 WL 5072239
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009); Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011). In Beleno, after winning
a preliminary motion on the question of whether the research might plausibly violate 14th Amendment
privacy rights, the parties settled out-of-court, resulting in destruction of 5.3 million samples that had been
stored for future research. Beleno, No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB, 2009 WL 5072239. Bearder went to the state
supreme court, which found that the genetic information contained in the samples meant that certain state
laws applied that created safeguards related to the retention and use of genetic information. 806 N.W.2d.
As a result, Minnesota destroyed all samples collected before 2011. Bayefsky et al., supra note 36.
44. Erin Rothwell et al., Secondary Research Uses of Residual Newborn Screening Dried
Bloodspots: A Scoping Review, 21 GENETIC MED. 1469, 1470 (2019).
45. Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Implications of
Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents, 97 AM J. HUM. GENETICS 6, 8 (2015) [hereinafter Botkin
III].
46. Laine Friedman Ross et al., Technical Report: Ethical and Policy Issues in Genetic Testing and
Screening of Children, 15 GENETIC MED. 234, 236 (2013).
47. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, ACOG Committee Opinion No. 778 Summary:
Newborn Screening and the Role of the Obstetrician-Gynecologist, 133 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1073 (2019).
48. SEC’Y ADVISORY COMM. ON HUM. RSCH. PROTECTIONS, Attachment E: Recommendations
Regarding Research Uses of Newborn Dried Bloodspots and the Newborn Screening Saves Lives
Reauthorization Act of 2014, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (April 24, 2015),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/2015-april-24-attachment-e/index.html.
49. Botkin II, supra note 39, at 122–23.
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C. GENOMIC DATA SHARING
In 2015, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) implemented a genomic
data sharing policy that applied to all NIH-funded research.50 Any project that
would generate large-scale genomic data was expected to deposit their data in a
public repository that could be accessed by other researchers.51 The purpose of
the NIH genomic data sharing (GDS) policy was to increase the amount of
available genomic data, which in turn allows for more powerful analyses of the
relationships between genetics and human health.52 NIH has a long history of
encouraging the sharing of data, but the GDS represented an ambitious attempt
to move towards the promise of personalized medicine.53 Since most genetic
traits are not mendelian, aggregation of large genomic data sets allows for
researchers to explore the complex relationships between an array of interrelated
genetic variants that can each contribute in subtle ways to a given health trait or
disease.54
With the advent of this policy, there has been extensive literature on
balancing the maximization of data utility with the protection of human subjects
from the risks of broad genomic data sharing.55 If explicit consent is required,
some people will decline to share, thus decreasing the breadth and value of the
data.56 Though there have been calls for tiered consent57 (where subjects are
given choices about how their data can be shared), there is also a recognition that

50. NIH issues finalized policy on genomic data sharing, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Aug. 27, 2014),
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-issues-finalized-policy-genomic-data-sharing.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PREAMBLE FOR THE GENOMIC DATA SHARING POLICY 1 (2014).
54. James Brian Byrd et al., Responsible, Practical Genomic Data Sharing that Accelerates
Research, 21 NATURE REV. GENETICS 615, 616 (2020).
55. See, e.g., Luca Bonomi, Yingxiang Huang & Lucila Ohno-Machado, Privacy Challenges and
Research Opportunities for Genomic Data Sharing, 52 NATURE GENETICS 646, 649–50 (2020) (noting
that broad consent can increase the utility of genomic data as it allows for individuals to give consent for
their primary research information for general research in the future); see also Linus Johnsson,
Hypothetical and Factual Willingness to Participate in Biobank Research, 18 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS
1261, 1261 (2010) (finding that for biobank research to be successful, people must view it positively
because regulation practices use people’s attitudes in survey assessments).
56. NIH
Genomic
Data
Sharing
Policy,
NAT’L
INSTS.
OF
HEALTH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-14-124.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
57. See Amy L. McGuire et al., To Share or Not to Share: A Randomized Trial of Consent for Data
Sharing in Genomic Research, 13 GENETICS MED. 948, 954 (2012) (finding that tiered consent gives
participants options ethically, but does not seriously hamper research); Amy L. McGuire et al., DNA Data
Sharing: Research Participants’ Perspectives, 10 GENETICS MED. 46, 47 (2008) (“We have advocated for
tiered consent, which does not compromise research participation and affords individuals the most control
and flexibility with regard to their genetic data sharing and release options . . .”).

MCGREW 01 (DO NOT DELETE)

12

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

2/9/22 3:44 PM

[VOL. 25:1

it is sometimes acceptable to maximize the deposition of genomic data by not
presenting an explicit choice about sharing one’s data.58
Unlike the NBS consent debate, policy guidance related to implementation
of the GDS policy called for explicit consent and rejected opt-out systems.59
Even if a decision was made that CMNs were not appropriate when obtaining
consent for broad sharing of genomic data, the debate about the contours of what
is or is not ethically appropriate are relevant to our discussion. Policy makers
attempted to navigate between the competing requirements of what law, ethics
and public opinion required, while not unnecessarily limiting the scope of data
sharing.60
Though the GDS policy outlines an expectation that explicit consent will
be obtained, this tension is illustrated by the NIH Office of Science Policy’s
(OSP) suggestion that a number of consent features that leave open the
possibility that explicit consent for the broad sharing of genomic data will not be
necessary in some situations. For example, though explicit consent would be
necessary for open access, OSP guidance suggests that explicit consent is not
necessary for data to be deposited in the controlled access tier.61 Similarly, when
the original research project has been granted a waiver of informed consent or
when the Common Rule regulations do not apply, mere disclosure of the data
sharing plan may be sufficient and exceptions to the consent requirement can be
sought.62
In practice, it appears that research institutions have favored broad consent
strategies.63 One can imagine a range of possible consent approaches, from very
granular to very passive.64 On the granular end, research subjects could be
presented with a detailed series of choices about how their data can be used (such
as a tiered consent).65 A less granular, but still explicit approach, includes
58. Jill M. Oliver et al., Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Genomic Data Sharing: Genomic
Research Participants’ Perspectives, 15 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 106, 113 (2012) (“However, in studies
where the primary goal is to create a community resource (e.g., a biobank), data sharing may be a condition
of participation and so tiered consent would not be practical or easy to implement.”).
59. Genomic Data Sharing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH OFF. OF SCI. POL’Y,
https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/genomic-data-sharing-faqs/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
60. See id. (noting that not only does the NIH have committees that inform the director of scientific
and ethical updates, but it also conducts periodic reviews of its research policies).
61. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDANCE ON CONSENT FOR FUTURE RESEARCH USE AND BROAD
SHARING OF HUMAN GENOMIC AND PHENOTYPIC DATA SUBJECT TO THE NIH GENOMIC DATA SHARING
POLICY
(NOV.
1,
2018),
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wpcontent/uploads/NIH_Guidance_on_Elements_of_Consent_under_the_GDS_Policy_07-13-2015.pdf.
62. Id. (“At minimum, the information described above should be provided to prospective
participants. Investigators may request exceptions to the NIH consent expectations for compelling
scientific reasons.”).
63. Zubin Master et al., Biobanks, Consent and Claims of Consensus, 9 NATURE METHODS 885, 885–
86 (2012).
64. See id. (discussing different consent types).
65. Id.
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providing details about the data sharing plan and giving an explicit choice about
whether to opt-in.66 A more passive approach includes asking for broad consent
by including details about the data sharing plan in the consent process without
drawing special attention to it or asking for consent about that discrete topic;
general consent to participate would include agreement to broad data sharing.67
According to one review of consent materials, granular, tiered consent appears
uncommon, with the majority of research institutions obtaining one-time broad
consent as part of the standard consent process (which does not include obtaining
separate, explicit consent for data sharing).68 The concept of asking for highlevel rather than granular consent is therefore in line with the spirit of CMNs.
Though none of these debates were framed in terms of nudging, they all
raise questions about the propriety of instituting an institution-level choice
masking nudge. Is it ethically acceptable to nudge research participants towards
receiving genetic information by hiding the existence of an opportunity to opt
out of learning such information? Similarly, is it ethically acceptable to hide a
choice to opt out of having your infant’s sample be stored for later research use,
creating a default that maximizes the number of available research samples? And
is it acceptable to require only broad consent in research, instead of requiring that
participants agree to more granular options? Questions of this variety abound in
medical research, and as the GDS case shows,69 the text of regulations alone does
not always clarify what should be done in practice. For that reason, we provide
commentary on the applicability of the reasonable person standard, the legal
standard applied to informed consent regulations to supplement our reading of
the regulations.
III. LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM AND CHOICE MASKING NUDGES
To provide clarification on what a CMN is, as well as the potential ethical
concerns such interventions might raise, it is useful to provide a brief
introduction to nudging. Nudges were first proposed by Cass Sunstein and
Richard Thaler as noncoercive interventions to improve individual wellbeing and
decision-making, supported by their proposed doctrine of libertarian
paternalism.70 Drawing on insights from behavioral economics suggesting that
human decision-making is plagued by systematic cognitive biases and irrational
decision-making heuristics, nudges trigger or tap into these biases or heuristics
to help people make better decisions for themselves.71 A nudge is “any aspect of
66. Genomic Data Sharing, supra note 59.
67. Zubin Master et al., supra note 63.
68. Id.
69. Genomic Data Sharing, supra note 59.
70. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
71. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13–14 (2011) (describing the tension
between fast and slow thinking and how this interaction impacts choices).
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the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”72
This is distinct from more familiar methods of persuasion, incentives, and
coercion. Proponents of nudging claim that it is particularly useful when
decisions “are difficult, complex, and infrequent, and when they have poor
feedback and few opportunities for learning,” and when choice architects can
“make good guesses about what is best for the Nudgees”—two conditions likely
to be met in medical research.73
A classic example of a libertarian paternalist nudge is changing the location
of food in a cafeteria so that healthy options are at eye-level and unhealthy ones
are less conspicuous.74 The idea here is that while many people claim they want
to eat healthier, when the time comes to do so, they are more likely to opt for
what is easily accessible and in front of them rather than choose what will
promote these ends, especially when they are hungry and faced with several
ready-made but unhealthy options.75 In other words, although people value and
care about healthy eating, they tend not to choose foods in ways that promote or
align with these values, due, perhaps, to fast and unconscious decision heuristics
or weakness of will.76 Nudging is proposed to help people overcome those
failures and make choices that better promote or align with their values by
intentionally modifying the location of healthy foods in cafeterias. Since we
know that people are likely to choose what is salient and easily accessible, we
can exploit that simply by changing the items that are most prominent from, say,
pastries and candy bars to apples and pears.77 This nudge is libertarian in the
sense that it is noncoercive. People are free to resist the nudge if they want to
badly enough: unhealthy foods are still available to purchase at the cafeteria; they
are just less salient.78 But this nudge is also paternalistic in the sense that
modifying the location of foods has the predictable and intended effect of
directing people to make healthier choices.
Sunstein and Thaler claim that “to count as a mere nudge, the intervention
must be easy and cheap to avoid.”79 In order words, nudges must be easily
resistible. Sunstein and Thaler distinguish nudges from other ways of influencing
choice, such as providing information or attempting to persuade, as well as from
72. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
73. Id. at 247.
74. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1–6.
75. See id. at 41 (describing how different states of arousal impact our decisions).
76. Id. at 49.
77. Id. at 25, 49.
78. Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby, On the Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: The
Importance of Conceptual Clarity, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 66, 66 (2019). A nudge might be easily resistible
in the sense that (a) it is easy to tell one is being nudged and ignore the influence or (b) it is easy to act in
a way other than what the nudge promotes. Id.
79. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
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more familiar instances of paternalism that coerce people to act in ways that
promote their own interests by eliminating options or imposing significant costs
on certain choices.80 For example, laws that require the use of seatbelts in cars
and helmets by those riding motorcycles are paternalistic; they are intended to
promote or protect the interests of people who ride in cars or on motorcycles.81
But people are not free to disobey these laws without incurring significant
penalties.82 Nudges involve a weaker form of paternalism, in that they are
noncoercive and influence choice—not by actually removing certain options or
attaching significant penalties to them, but rather, by altering the presentation of
options in a way that influences choice in a predictable way. Recall our cafeteria
example. The libertarian paternalist does not advocate for tripling the price of
unhealthy items or ceasing to sell them at all. All she advocates for is changing
the location of items to make certain options more or less salient to her hungry
customers.
Some might claim that CMNs cause trouble for the “libertarian” part of
libertarian paternalism. Aren’t nudges that mask available options significantly
different than nudges that simply change the location or salience of options, since
the former involve something like intentionally hiding available options while
the latter does not? We aver that CMNs still qualify as “libertarian” (in the sense
that they respect individuals’ autonomy and freedom to choose). While certain
choices are masked and so not listed on the menu of options, masked options are
still easily available to those who seek to access them, and the possibility of
opting-out should be sufficiently clear to those who wish to exercise it. What is
and is not being masked is crucial in our analysis of CMNs. To be defensible,
information about masked options and how to access them must be easily
available. Only then does a CMN meet the resistibility requirement.
Rearranging foods in a cafeteria so that people make healthier choices for
themselves will strike most as an innocuous intervention. And indeed, the classic
examples that proponents of nudges appeal to when introducing and motivating
this novel policy tool tend to be similarly innocuous. Sunstein and Thaler talk
about nudging more employees into saving for retirement by changing the default
enrollment from opt-in to opt-out, or restaurants serving food on smaller plates
to make diners believe they are eating more than they actually are.83 But some
proposed uses of nudges are more controversial. Such controversial nudges
extend beyond low-stakes decision environments like cafeterias and into highstakes decision environments like exam rooms, where patients might be nudged
into choosing a treatment by a physician who frames the risks and benefits of
80.
81.
1971).
82.
83.

Id. at 11.
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE L. 181, 182 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed.,
Id. at 188.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 108–10.
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that treatment in a particular way.84 Moreover, not all proposed uses of nudges
are intended to benefit the individual who is nudged. For example, consider optout systems for organ donation that default drivers into becoming an organ
donor—increasing the supply of organs surely benefits society as a whole, but it
is hard to see how such a nudge could benefit the donor directly. Exactly who
benefits from nudges is an important issue and in what follows, we will argue
that nudges that are intended to benefit the individual who is nudged are easier
to justify than nudges that are supposed to benefit someone else, or society as a
whole. All three circumstances, however, are justifiable, provided they meet our
acceptability conditions.
The ubiquity of nudging makes sense once we recognize that the features
of decision making that make us susceptible to nudges are present whenever we
make decisions. We cannot help but be influenced by the way things are
presented to us, nor can we help but interact with a world that is presented in one
way rather than another. Sunstein and Thaler term this the “inevitability” of
choice architecture and its influence: people have to make decisions, and it is not
as if there is some neutral way of arranging things that will have no effect on the
decisions people ultimately make.85 There is no such thing as a neutral way of
presenting or framing choices, since how choices are presented or framed will
inevitably affect what people choose. If those who are in a position to arrange
choices cannot help but to exert some influence, then does it not make most sense
to arrange things in a way that is likely to steer people towards good choices and
away from bad ones? Indeed, this appeal to the inevitability of influencing is
often a powerful response to those who argue that nudges are objectionably
manipulative.86
Even if we cannot help but influence peoples’ decisions in some way, and
even if nudges are noncoercive and so are in this sense less objectionable than
strongly paternalistic interventions, nudges still involve an intentional
manipulation of the environment: choice architects steer people toward certain
choices and away from others. This sort of meddling cries out to many as
standing in need of justification. Thankfully, proponents of nudges have had a
lot to say in their defense.

84. Moti Gorin et al., Justifying Clinical Nudges, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32, 33–34 (2017).
85. Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 175 (2003)
[hereinafter Libertarian Paternalism].
86. See id. at 176–77 (discussing how the cafeteria example showcases inevitability when default
options are required); see Cass Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 413, 421–22
(2015) [hereinafter The Ethics of Nudging] (using nature and common law to show that “choice
architecture is inevitable”). But see Kevin Vallier, On the Inevitability of Nudging, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 817, 818–19 (2016) (noting that “shaping,” as opposed to nudging, uses decision making flaws,
not persuasion, to influence choices); David M. Hausman & Bryan Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not to
Nudge, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 123, 133–36 (2010) (finding that nudges are “largely cases of rational
persuasion”).
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First, as we have seen, nudges promote beneficial outcomes. Effectively
implemented nudges help people make choices that may benefit them: they eat
healthier, save for their retirement, enroll in health insurance, and make
contributions to their pension plan.87 Many people prefer these things for
themselves but will not take action to bring them about due to the operation of
cognitive biases or heuristics. Effectively implemented nudges also help people
make choices that make other people better off: they become organ donors and
safer drivers, they donate to charity, they prescribe their patients generic versions
of drugs rather than the more expensive brand names and speak to their patients
about their goals and values for end-of-life care.88 And finally, effectively
implemented nudges also help people make choices that promote public goods:
they litter less, recycle more, and use less energy.89 Nudges can play an important
role in helping to bring about these important beneficial outcomes.
Second, nudges respect freedom of choice. Nudges influence choice, not by
changing the menu of available options or by significantly changing economic
incentives by making some available options significantly more expensive than
others, but rather by changing the way options are presented or framed, thus
respecting freedom of choice.90
Finally, survey evidence suggests that people do not mind nudges and
actually prefer nudges to other, stronger forms of influencing choice, at least
when they endorse the goals the nudges are intended to promote.91 For example,
there is survey evidence illustrating that in liberal democracies, strong majorities
approve of nudges that protect and promote health and safety, as well as those
that protect the environment, and that they prefer these to more coercive laws
that promote those same goals.92 Interestingly, the hypothetical nudges that
individuals were surveyed about generally concerned public health outcomes—
such as efforts to prevent obesity, limit salt consumption, discourage tobacco
use, and reduce deaths from distracted driving.93

87. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 5–6.
88. Jennifer L. Matjasko et al., Applying Behavioral Economics to Public Health Policy: Illustrative
Examples and Promising Directions, 50 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S13, S16–S18 (5 Supp. 1, 2016).
89. See Alcott & Rogers, supra note 3, at 3025–29 (finding that the use of advertising and capital
stocks alerted people to energy conservation).
90. Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 85, at 175.
91. See Dragos Petrescu et al., Public Acceptability in the UK and USA of Nudging to Reduce
Obesity: The Example of Reducing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Consumption, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2
(2016); see also LUCIA A. REISCH ET AL., Most People Like Nudges—and Why that Matters, in THEORIES
OF CHOICE: THE SOC. SCI. AND THE L. OF DECISION MAKING 73, 85–86 (Stefan Grundmann & Philipp
Hacker eds., 2021).
92. REISCH ET AL., supra note 91, at 85 (noting that survey participants were asked whether they
approved or disapproved of 15 hypothetical nudges and none of the hypothetical nudges seemed to be a
CMN).
93. Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 191 (2019) [hereinafter Do
People Like Nudges?] (referencing Table 3).
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IV. THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD AND RESEARCH REGULATIONS
The proposal to use CMNs in medical research might initially appear to
directly contradict the requirements of full disclosure that came to dominate the
informed consent jurisprudence in clinical care and medical research in the midtwentieth century. However, we have reason to believe that CMNs are
compatible with existing jurisprudence and legal norms. Our arguments depend
on two claims: first, that there is a key difference between choices that have
significant bodily autonomy implications and those that are primarily
informational; and second, that disclosure requirements do not necessarily
require the presentation of explicit choices about the information disclosed. In
this Part IV, we argue that the aim of the reasonable person standard, properly
understood and applied to the kind of informational decisions in medical research
that we are concerned with here, supports CMNs (even if it may have
legitimately been taken to support full disclosure requirements in other contexts).
Because this standard is part of the United States federal regulations governing
research and because the reasonable person standard is so deeply embedded in
the American legal tradition,94 a justification for CMNs that appeals to the
reasonable person standard also fits into that tradition.95
A. Informed Consent Jurisprudence Supporting Full Disclosure
Informed consent jurisprudence from the second half of the twentieth
century is characterized by landmark decisions underscoring the importance of
physicians disclosing relevant medical information to their patients.96 The cases
that make up that jurisprudence typically involved physicians failing to inform
patients of bodily harm risks that subsequently materialized.97 In early informed
consent cases, the patients’ right to full disclosure was ostensibly grounded in
their right to bodily integrity.98 That autonomy interest was sufficiently
94. Dennis J. Mazur, Influence of the law on risk and informed consent, 327 BMJ 731, 731–32
(2003).
95. See Robert Unikel, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 327 (1992) (noting that reasonableness has been used
in American jurisprudence for at least 140 years).
96. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(“In discussing the elements of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the
full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.”); see also Berkey v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr.
67, 77 (1969) (stating that the doctor-patient relationship is fiduciary in character and for that reason
requires “full disclosure”).
97. Christine S. Coca Nour, Informed Consent - It’s More Than a Signature on a Piece of Paper, 214
AM. J. SURGERY 993, 996 (2017).
98. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 217 (1905) (establishing the right to bodily integrity at the
beginning of the 20th century); see also RUTH FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 142 (1986) (noting that, “[c]ivil liberties, self-determination, fraud, bodily integrity, trespass,
the fiduciary relationship, contract, and the like were all staples of the law,” surrounding informed consent
for decades in the 1900s).
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important to ground the right to be informed about actions that may infringe it,
and to be presented with an option to not participate in invasive medical
procedures. But the right to bodily integrity can be meaningfully analyzed in
terms of the reasonable person standard (RPS), as later informed consent rulings
have done.99 Intuitively, a reasonable person would expect full disclosure of
relevant treatment options and risks in a situation where her bodily autonomy is
at stake.100 A standard of reasonableness would also give a research participant
claims to a high level of explicit choice regarding decisions with bodily
autonomy implications. Understanding the informed consent requirements in
terms of the RPS is helpful because it offers guidance even in cases of research
questions that do not obviously pose threats to bodily autonomy, as is the case
for many of the informational choices we consider in this paper as candidates for
CMNs.
B. The Reasonable Person Standard and Medical Research Nudging
Before returning to our argument regarding the RPS and CMNs, it is worth
making some more remarks about the reasonable person standard. The difficulty
of creating rules that will be appropriate in every context has long been
acknowledged.101 The RPS responds to this challenge by building flexibility into
rules so their guidance may remain relevant, despite changing social contexts. In
fact, the content of the RPS cannot be precisely pinned down by law because it
refers to social facts beyond the reach of legislation.102 The standard is widely
accepted in a variety of legal applications, including negligence, contract,
administrative law, judicial review, and criminal law.103 A typical definition of
the reasonable person standard describes “an imaginary actor who represents the
community consensus of acceptable or appropriate behavior. This consensus
establishes neither a standard of what average persons do nor an aspirational
ideal beyond the reach of most persons, but a minimum threshold below which

99. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (analyzing informed consent
disclosure requirements in terms of the RPS, the first case to explicitly refer to the RPS instead of other
justifications like bodily autonomy).
100. See Danielle Bromwich & Joseph Millum, Disclosure and Consent to Medical Research
Participation, 12 J. MORAL PHIL. 195, 197–99 (2015) (claiming that adequate disclosure is a necessary
(if not sufficient) requirement of valid informed consent, and disclosing the information that a reasonable
person would expect to be told is sufficient to satisfy the disclosure requirement).
101. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 99 (Lesley Brown ed., David Ross trans., Oxford
U. Press 2009) (“The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a
universal statement which will be correct.”).
102. John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L. Q. REV. 563, 571 (2015) (“[T]he
zone of the reasonable person . . . is a legally deregulated zone in the sense that the law leaves it to be
determined as a question of fact, not a question of law, how the law (meaning other law apart from the
law which is currently being applied) is to be counted inside that zone.”).
103. Id. at 570.

MCGREW 01 (DO NOT DELETE)

20

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

2/9/22 3:44 PM

[VOL. 25:1

the ordinary person may not fall without being found deficient.”104 Despite some
disagreement on the nature of the RPS,105 experts generally agree that the
standard must be applied on a case-by-case basis106 and that it includes a range
of behavioral standards.107 Ultimately, the RPS provides instructions on making
judgements about what a reasonable person would do, and its legal prominence
gives those judgements legal weight. Standards set by the RPS, formulated in
this impersonal way, “do not bend to the varying personal characteristics of those
who are judged by them.”108
Nevertheless, describing how the RPS is used does not tell us what it means
to be reasonable. One suggestion from philosophical literature comes from
Thomas Scanlon, who notes that a reasonable person must both consider an
appropriate body of facts to be relevant to the question at hand and engage in an
acceptable pattern of reasoning on the basis of those facts.109 This process should
occur against the backdrop of acceptable general aims and concerns.110
Importantly, reasonable does not mean self-interested; a reasonable person may
sometimes recognize that others’ interests override her own.111 The reasonable
person must have reasonable concerns and respond to them in a rational way. For
our purposes in analyzing CMNs, this standard imposes some normative
constraints on reasonable research participants. While they can and should be
concerned with their own welfare and utility, research participants should also
be responsive to social interests and to the interests of others, and the way they
make decisions should reflect those considerations. Their reasoning should give
appropriate—but not overriding—weight to social interest, and they should also
strive to act in ways that they can justify. Fleshed out in this way, we have a
somewhat clearer picture of what it means to apply a reasonable person standard
to participants in medical research. And it should be unsurprising that as
context—that is, the reasons one must respond to—changes, the most reasonable
courses of action may change as well.

104. FADEN ET AL., supra note 98, at 29.
105. See, e.g., Alan Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 325 (2012)
(discussing whether reasonableness should be a normative or positive concept in law).
106. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and
the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S. C. L. REV. 293, 301 (1997) (using Professor David Slawson’s
comments on contracts that their meaning depends on the situation in which they are created, so as a result
the reasonable person standard is “constructed on a case by case basis”).
107. Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable
Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817 (2001).
108. Gardner, supra note 102, at 27–28.
109. THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 32 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2000).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., JOSEPH MILLUM, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PARENTHOOD 136–38 (2018) (noting
that the reasonable subject standard suggests a decision maker who is not selfish and instead “takes into
account all the relevant practical reasons of which she is aware, prudential and moral,” so the interests of
others may sometimes take precedence over the subject’s interest).
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The RPS is helpful in explaining why the aforementioned body of
jurisprudence that stresses the importance of informed consent may not translate
directly to some contemporary medical research situations. The key contextual
difference comes from the type of decision participants are asked to make in the
research setting—specifically, whether they have immediate implications for
bodily integrity or whether they are primarily informational.112 Informational
choices are less likely to infringe on a research participant’s bodily integrity and
more likely to affect individuals other than the nudgee than are physical choices,
which primarily affect the research participant in an immediate bodily way.
Potential benefit to others provides further support for informational nudges that
are unlikely to be available for physical nudges. Reasonable disclosure and
consent expectations where the physical consequences of medical research
decisions are severe and individual decisions are not likely to significantly affect
others, we argue, differ from reasonable expectations in contexts where decisions
carry minor risk of causing serious injury but could have important consequences
for research participants, others, and society more broadly. The RPS would not
necessarily require explicit disclosure of the choice hidden by CMNs for two
reasons: first, the CMN should be accompanied by sufficient information for
participants to realize they have the option of opting out of defaults and for them
to make sense of the defaults they are being nudged toward; and second, the fact
that a choice is masked is expected to be in the participant’s best interests.
C. Regulations and the RPS
If the RPS can theoretically accommodate CMNs, the next question is
whether existing regulations governing research with human subjects legally
permit their use. In the United States, the revised Common Rule lays out detailed
requirements for informed consent.113 These regulations are interesting for our
purposes because in addition to referring to RPS, they also seem to allow for
CMNs, provided that the CMNs do not also mask important information.114 The
most general level of guidance from the Common Rule focuses on ensuring that
research participants are provided with enough information and opportunities for
discussion to make informed decisions.115 Note that the regulations do not

112. See infra Part II.A.
113. Off. for Hum. Rsch. Prots., Clinical Trial Informed Consent Form Posting (45 CFR 46.116(h)),
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/informedconsent-posting/index.html. See HHS General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. 46.116
(2018) (detailing requirements for informed consent).
114. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2018).
115. Id.
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specify how that information be presented, or what kinds of choices must be
made available, much less clearly communicated:116
(a)(4) The prospective subject or the legally authorized representative
must be provided with the information that a reasonable person would
want to have in order to make an informed decision about whether to
participate, and an opportunity to discuss that information….(i)
Informed consent must begin with a concise and focused presentation
of the key information that is most likely to assist a prospective subject
or legally authorized representative in understanding the reasons why
one might or might not want to participate in the research. This part
of the informed consent must be organized and presented in a way that
facilitates comprehension. (ii) Informed consent as a whole must
present information in sufficient detail relating to the research, and
must be organized and presented in a way that does not merely provide
lists of isolated facts but rather facilitates the prospective subject’s or
legally authorized representative’s understanding of the reasons why
one might or might not want to participate.117
The general guidance regarding information and understanding is followed
by a more specific list of the kinds of statements and disclosures to be provided
to research subjects.118 Again, the regulations focus specifically on providing
information in the form of statements and do not mention soliciting choices.119
The regulations are oriented toward disclosing enough information for research
participants to adequately understand what they are agreeing to participate in.
One of our conditions on CMNs is that they must provide sufficient information
to understand the implications of the default decision.120 While CMNs involve
masking some choices—specifically, by only presenting participants with a set
of default options outlined in the consent form—they may not hide information
relevant to the choice. In fact, providing such information is necessary to ensure
that the default choice opt-out mechanism is robust. Since opt-out mechanisms
rely on participants’ self-identifying concerns with default options, they must be
provided with enough information to be able to form an opinion about those
options and be made aware that they can voice disagreement or discomfort at any
time.121 Since the informed consent regulatory requirements are silent on
whether additional explicit choices—such as those that come after the primary
decision to enroll in a study—must be presented as long as there is reasonable
116. Critics might object that it is only in the most literal interpretation of the letter of the law that
these regulations could be seen as relating to information and not presentation of choices. But it is clearly
within the spirit of the law to adjust to what is reasonable. If presentation of choices is restricted for
reasonable reasons, there is no reason to think that it contradicts the spirit of the regulations, either.
117. 45 C.F.R § 46.116(a) (2018).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part IV.B.
121. See supra Part I (discussing CMN opt-out mechanisms).
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disclosure, it seems entirely compatible with our presentation of CMNs.
Ultimately, the RPS must be used to determine what qualifies as sufficient
information. The revised Common Rule explicitly refers to the RPS because it is
the standard-setter used to put these regulations into practice.122
D. Making Use of the RPS
A plausible picture of how the RPS could be applied to CMNs, consistent
with prevailing United States research regulations, emerges from the above
discussion. If we accept that a reasonable choice is one that balances interests
and harms in a reasonable manner, we might accept something like the following:
medical researchers must present research participants with the choices that a
reasonable person would have an interest in being able to make. That stipulation
prevents researchers from masking certain choices—specifically, ones ruled out
by the autonomy and acceptability considerations articulated later in this paper—
although it can at best be used as a rough heuristic, given the controversy over
the definition of reasonableness. By the same token, we would also accept the
similar claim that medical researchers are not under an obligation to provide
research participants with choices that no reasonable person could claim a right
to make. Such a position makes it clear that researchers have some discretion in
which choices they present to research participants. Notably, while we
understand the RPS as justifying masking the number of options presented to
research participants, we do not take it to justify information masking. The
balance of individual, collective, and social consequences of masking choices
explain why it is reasonable to do so. In the situations we are interested in,
masking information would not contribute to those positive consequences (and
would infringe upon important autonomy interests), and thus would not be
supported by the RPS.
V. AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION
While bioethicists all agree that autonomy is an important ethical
consideration, there are many different views about what autonomy is and what

122. 45 C.F.R § 46.116(a)(4). Interestingly, the revised Common Rule also describes instances in
which the informed consent requirement may be waived or altered. 45 C.F.R § 46.116(e). Informed
consent may not be required at all in cases where research involves no more than minimal risk, could not
be carried out otherwise, will not affect the rights or welfare of participants, though it stipulates that
participants should be provided with relevant information where applicable. 45 C.F.R § 46.116(b). The
CMNs we propose meet those conditions, yet we still propose providing the disclosures required for
informed consent. The fact that the regulations would countenance even withholding information in some
situations suggests that our proposal to mask choice is not beyond the realm of what is already considered
acceptable. See Joseph Millum & Danielle Bromwich, Informed Consent: What Must Be Disclosed and
What Must Be Understood, 21 AM. J. BIOETHICS 46 (2021) (discussing disclosure and understanding in
informed consent).
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type of conduct violates it.123 For our purposes, a rough and fairly intuitive
characterization will suffice: autonomy is the capacity to be one’s own person or
to be the author of one’s own life.124 A person exercises her autonomy when her
choices reflect, are based on, or align with, reasons, values, or preferences that
are her own, rather than those that have been externally imposed on her.125 We
respect someone’s autonomy when we let them choose for themselves, according
to the things that matter to them, and accept the decisions that they make. The
aim of this Part V is not to challenge the preeminence of autonomy or to endorse
any particular account of it, but rather to argue that CMNs are at least compatible
with many plausible views of autonomy and may even promote it. Ultimately,
we maintain that whether a CMN is justified depends on a comparison of the
benefits to be gained by nudging with the autonomy-costs that come from
masking the choice. Relevant to this question, we shall argue, is whether the
CMN satisfies the four conditions we lay out in Part VI. In our view, when these
conditions are met, the benefits to be gained by masking a choice are sufficient
to justify the cost to autonomy. Our primary concern is with helping research
participants make good decisions that they care about, which can itself enhance
autonomy.126
In this Part V, we will survey prominent accounts of what autonomy is and
why we must respect it and argue that most of these views are compatible with
CMNs. We acknowledge, however, that some accounts of autonomy sit less
comfortably with CMNs. Specifically, CMNs might cause trouble for views on
which respecting autonomy requires engaging with a chooser’s deliberative
capacities or ensuring that a chooser decides on the basis of information that is
relevant to the choice. People who believe that respect for autonomy requires
interacting with a chooser’s decision-making capacities in this particular way are
unlikely to accept our defense of CMNs. However, we suggest that the relevant
question is not whether there is any cost to autonomy at all, but rather how
significant that cost is, and whether the stakes of the choice are great enough that
such an autonomy-violation is ethically unacceptable.

123. Decision-Making - Module 3, UNIV. OF MIAMI MILLER SCH. OF MED. INST. FOR BIOETHICS AND
HEALTH POL’Y, https://bioethics.miami.edu/education/ethics-curricula/geriatrics-and-ethics/decisionmaking-autonomy-valid-consent-and-guardianship/index.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
124. See, e.g., John Christman, Autonomy and Personal History, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 1 (1991)
(“Virtually any appraisal of a person’s welfare, integrity, or moral status, as well as the moral and political
theories built on such appraisals, will rely crucially on the presumption that her preferences and values
are in some important sense her own.”); see also Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of
a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 6–7 (1971) (explaining that humans have the ability to make decisions based on their
desires); JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM, 369-424 (1988) (providing the definition for autonomy).
125. See Chris Mills, The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture, 6 REV. PHIL. AND PSYCH. 495, 496–97
(2015) (noting the language in the context of nudges).
126. See Cass Sunstein, Autonomy by Default, 16 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Autonomy
by Default] (discussing how nudges can enhance autonomy).
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Though we defend CMNs in a variety of research settings and for a variety
of decisions, we recognize the existence of a special domain of decisions that
relate directly or are foundational to one’s identity or deep moral commitments,
and we claim that individuals ought not to be nudged regarding those
decisions.127 Consider, for example, a sincerely held religious belief about what
makes life worth living or the sort of activities one ought never to engage in.
Acting in accordance with those kinds of deep commitments fosters autonomous
authenticity.128 CMNs that nudge individuals to make decisions that go against
those commitments, if effective, could make them feel complicit in something
they consider morally reprehensible, resulting in feelings of moral distress and
autonomy harm.129 For example, imagine that someone who, for religious
reasons, is morally opposed to genetic cloning is nudged into providing genetic
material to a biobank primarily used to support research into cloning. Because
her deep religious commitment against cloning is so central to her identity, the
sense of moral harm from being nudged into contradicting it could constitute an
autonomy harm. Plausible views of autonomy recognize this protected domain;
the domain thus constrains the kinds of choices that we may permissibly mask.130
Even if the idea that such a protected domain exists makes sense in theory,
however, respecting that domain poses serious practical challenges. For one
thing, how can we evaluate the sincerity of individuals’ identity-centric
convictions? One individual’s deep moral commitment is another’s weak
preference. Relatedly, how are we to respond to extremely uncommon religious
beliefs or moral commitments that researchers are unlikely to anticipate? Some
heuristics may reduce the extent of this problem. For example, it is easier to
anticipate the deep convictions of groups than of individuals, because groups
often publicly articulate their fundamental commitments. Self-identified group
membership is thus a likely indicator of beliefs that fall within the protected
domain, albeit an imperfect one. For some decisions, public survey data may be
helpful in judging whether a particular view is common and deeply held—some
surveys, for example, show that many people express deep discomfort with
research into genetic cloning.131 Researchers should make their best efforts to
anticipate what kinds of CMNs are likely to involve nudging people into identityformational decisions and consequently, should strive to avoid utilizing those
127. See Stephen Wall, Perfectionism, Reasonableness, and Respect, 42 POL. THEORY 468 (2014).
These commitments are difficult to identify, and it is controversial whether they should be accorded such
importance. Id. at 477–78.
128. See, e.g., David Enoch, Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy, 128 ETHICS 6, 30–
34 (2017) (discussing the importance of authenticity, under the label “nonalienation”).
129. See Stephen Campbell et al., A Broader Understanding of Moral Distress, 16 AM. J. BIOETHICS
2, 5 (2016) (discussing the effects of decision making on moral distress).
130. Id.
131. Philip Reilly, Public Concern About Genetics, 1 ANN. REV. GENOMICS AND HUMAN GENETICS
485, 488 (2000).
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CMNs. The unfortunate fact that researchers may not always succeed doing so
underscores the importance of ensuring that CMNs only mask information—not
choices—and that easy opt-out mechanisms exist.
A. Genuine Choice
A prominent feature of many views of autonomy is the requirement that an
autonomous individual possesses a genuine choice between a variety of different
outcomes.132 While few views on autonomy hold that genuine choice is entirely
constitutive of autonomy, it is so often a prerequisite for autonomy that it
warrants discussion on its own.133 Genuine choice has two distinct components:
availability of options and the freedom to choose between them.134 A critic of
CMNs might claim that these nudges should be rejected since they restrict both
the set of available options and someone’s freedom to choose from that set. If
true, this objection would constitute a serious strike against the argument for
using CMNs.
As is clear from their very name, CMNs attempt to make certain choices
less apparent to those being nudged. Recall that the primary motivation for
introducing CMNs was to not suggest certain options to individuals who did not
have prior preferences about those options when those options are expected to
have negative effects on the chooser or on others.135 CMNs are not intended to
actually reduce the chooser’s option set—importantly, they must be easily
resistible and include a clear opt-out mechanism—but they are undeniably
intended to make the option set appear more limited.136 The opt-out mechanism
must be easy to locate for individuals who wish to choose a masked option. But
what about the individuals who never seek an opt-out mechanism, regardless of
whether they would have wanted it, because they do not realize that an option
was masked in the first place? For individuals who recognize the CMN and take
the easy, available steps to opt-out, the nudge clearly does not interfere with
either component of genuine choice. The important question, therefore, is how
significantly masking a) decreases the number of available options and b)
interferes with the ability—for individuals who do not act to avoid the nudge—
to choose.

132. Autonomy, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomy (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
133. See RAZ, supra note 124, at 372 (finding that the autonomous person must have sufficient mental
abilities to plan her life, she must make choices independently for herself, and she must choose from an
adequate range of options); Enoch, supra note 128, at 32–33 (considering “sovereignty” and
“nonalienation” to be key components of autonomy; both require having genuine choice in shaping one’s
life).
134. William James, On the Will to Believe, LUMEN, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/sunyclassicreadings/chapter/william-james-on-the-will-to-believe/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
135. See supra Part II.
136. See infra Part VI.C.
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It seems unlikely that CMNs will affect the number of available options or
research participants’ ability to choose to such a degree as to make their choice
nonautonomous. This claim may ultimately result in the need to compare the
costs and benefits of the CMN and its effects on genuine choice. As we
emphasized above, the sort of CMNs we aim to defend affect only the
appearance of choice: to be justified, a CMN must not alter the underlying
options and must be easily avoidable. In practice, the nudgee must be aware that
some choices are being masked, and an easy way to avoid the nudge must be
available if they seek it. Thus, we contend that if ethically acceptable CMNs
restrict autonomy, this is only a minor restriction. And importantly, ensuring a
maximal degree of autonomous choice is not the only desiderata for a CMN; it
is also important that the nudge helps participants make better decisions in
medical research. Thus, even if CMNs unavoidably represent some deviation
from the genuine choice conception of autonomy, the safeguards that we
stipulate ensure that they protect autonomy to a sufficient degree. When we
compare the potential for a (slight) diminution of genuine choice with the
benefits expected from an acceptable nudge, the CMNs seem justified.
B. Making Important Decisions
CMNs might also be criticized on the autonomy grounds that they prevent
research participants from making important decisions for themselves, since
being able to make certain important decisions is a prominent feature of some
accounts of the ethical importance of autonomy.137 On these views, what matters
for autonomy is that the person makes the important choices that clearly shape
the major features of their life. But not all choices are equally important in
shaping a life. As we explained earlier in this Part V, we should not mask choices
that relate to the protected domain of identity-related decisions; those kinds of
choices are undoubtedly life-shaping.138
Making important decisions does not require that autonomous people have
genuine choice over every decision they could possibly make. While respect for
autonomy requires allowing individuals to make the most personal identityforming decisions independently, many decisions in medical research are not of
that type.139 Just as we routinely accept that autonomy interests do not allow us
to make all types of decisions in our everyday lives— such as which side of the
street to drive on, whether to educate our children, and what we pay in taxes—

137. See RAZ, supra note 124, at 369 (noting autonomy is “the vision of people controlling, to some
degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives”).
138. See supra Part V.
139. For example, participants are not generally consulted when logistical or technical choices need
to be made about how research procedures are performed (e.g., size of needle, timing of administration,
etc.). Participants also generally have no input core scientific questions (e.g., design of the protocol,
recruitment strategies, decisions about halting or extending a study).
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autonomy does not require that we make all types of decisions in medical
research. Some constraints on choice are a necessary part of living in society and
do not unduly impinge on autonomy.140 Interestingly, this account of what
matters for autonomy might supplement arguments for the use of CMNs.141
Nudges that mask relatively minor choices could actually promote autonomy,
then, by freeing individuals to expend their limited cognitive energy on decisions
that are the most crucial to personal autonomy.
C. Understanding and Engaging with Options
Another way to think about how CMNs might infringe upon autonomy
comes from the requirements of informed consent, a widely recognized and core
tenet of medical ethics intended to ensure that research participants understand
what they are agreeing to. Roughly, the idea is that obtaining informed consent
is a good way to ensure that a participant’s decision is autonomous—but only if
the participant has sufficient understanding of the decision. Adequate
understanding is one of the key requirements for informed consent outlined in
Beauchamp and Childress’s famous text outlining the basic principles of
bioethics.142 According to their view, autonomous choice requires not only a
sufficient range of options, but also sufficient understanding of those options, as
well the cognitive capacities that are necessary to make well-informed decisions
on the basis of that understanding.143 Further, one might add that it is not enough
merely to understand the options and possess the necessary cognitive capacities
to make well-informed decisions; one must also engage those cognitive
capacities by deliberating over the available options before selecting one
This view of autonomy is concerned with the process of making a decision,
and CMNs are admittedly more concerned with decision outcomes than with
processes.144 CMNs are not designed to be educative; their aim is not to inform
or increase one’s understanding, nor is it to make it more likely that people
choose on the basis of relevant information.145 Rather, CNMs aim to help people
140. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME 3: HARM TO SELF 38
(1989) (stating where there are “settled practices, defined by well-understood conventions,” the
autonomous person cannot simply “invent his own alternative rules for playing the public game”).
141. The Ethics of Nudging, supra note 86, at 438 (“It is also important to see that autonomy does not
require choices everywhere. It does not justify an insistence on active choosing in all contexts. If we had
to make choices about everything that affects us, we would quickly be overwhelmed. There is a close
relationship between time-management and autonomy. People should be allowed to devote attention to
the questions that, in their view, deserve their attention. If people have to make choices everywhere, their
autonomy is reduced, if only because they cannot focus on those activities that seem to them most worthy
of their attention”).
142. TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1, 13 (8th ed.
2009).
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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make better choices, specifically by steering them away from choices that
researchers have good reason to believe are bad.146 So, if autonomy requires an
understanding of the options that are available, being well-informed about the
information that is relevant to a choice, deliberating, and ultimately choosing an
option based on that relevant information, CMNs may threaten to infringe on
autonomy because they cannot ensure that participants understand the default
decisions they are nudged toward.
However, it is important to notice that this is not a knock-down argument
against CMNs. For one thing, it is not obvious that slightly reducing people’s
information counts as a real cost to their autonomy. We typically do not believe
that people always need to be informed about all the available options in order
to act autonomously: what matters is that they are sufficiently informed. So, for
example, we do not think that a clinical investigator infringes on the autonomy
of their subjects by failing to tell their subjects the entire range of information
that might somehow bear on their choice about whether to participate. Indeed, it
is hard to see how a clinical investigator could do that and still have time to carry
out any of their research. Rather, the investigator has an obligation to disclose all
the information that they have reason to believe would be relevant to the
prospective participant’s decision.147 The fact that a specific CMN exists may
not be necessary to disclose if participants are informed that they may request
modified treatment regarding default options they disagree with.148 But, even if
one resists this argument and thinks that providing less information always has
some autonomy cost, the cost is likely to be quite low in the sorts of cases we are
concerned with.149 We are not proposing an insuperable barrier to people
receiving the relevant information about alternative options, but we are requiring
that they take an extra step. That is why CMNs are nudges, and not more stringent
restrictions on choice. Since this cost is quite small, it is likely to be outweighed
in most of the cases we are concerned with, either by the benefits of the nudge,
or even other considerations of autonomy—for example, the fact that CMNs,
when well-executed, can lead people to make choices that better align with their
own values.150
D. Successfully Reaching One’s Own Goals
A final way to understand autonomy draws on the distinction made between
“means” and “ends” paternalism. Ends paternalism involves guiding people
146. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
147. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 142, at 123.
148. Id.
149. Moreover, this cost would be comparable to ways we regularly accept that living in society
detracts autonomy.
150. See Autonomy by Default, supra note 126, at 63 (discussing the way in which nudges enhance
patient autonomy).
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toward goals that they do not identify as their own, whereas means paternalism
involves guiding people toward goals that they do identify as their own.151 Put
slightly different, means paternalism assists people in taking the correct means
to their own ends, whereas ends paternalism involves changing people’s ends.152
In his book, Why Nudge?, Cass Sunstein argues that we respect autonomy so
long as we respect people’s own ends.153 In other words, as long as nudges are
always instances of means paternalism, and never instances of ends paternalism,
then we need not worry about whether those nudges respect autonomy because
respecting autonomy is merely about “allowing individuals to make informed
decisions about their own ends.”154 According to this view, in order to assess a
nudge’s impact on autonomy, all we must ask is whether the person who is
nudged is “better off, as judged by themselves.”155 We decide autonomously
when we ultimately get what we want, and we respect someone’s autonomy
when we help them get what they want.156
There are reasons to doubt that this account of autonomy really captures
what it is to be autonomous, and therefore what it is to respect someone’s
autonomy. For one thing, the distinction between means and ends paternalism is
not as sharp as this view might suggest. In many cases, participants will not have
strong prior preferences about the options being masked or towards which they
are being nudged.157 Moreover, individuals adopt ends for a variety of reasons,
including because of previous nudges or other social influences.158 Selfproclaimed ends may reflect prior influences just as much as they reflect what is
central to an individual’s autonomy.159 It is thus often unclear when nudges are
more properly considered examples of ends or means paternalism.160 As a result,
this view of autonomy is only of limited usefulness in analyzing nudges.

151. CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 63 (2014).
152. Id. at 138.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 5.
156. See, e.g., Jukka Varelius, The value of autonomy in medical ethics, 9 MED., HEALTH CARE AND
PHIL. 377, 377 (2006) (stating that by making our own choices we are giving our lives “meaning, purpose,
and distinctive uniqueness, and/or expressing ourselves”).
157. See Tina A.G. Venema et al., When in Doubt, Follow the Crowd? Responsiveness to Social Proof
Nudges in the Absence of Clear Preferences, 11 FRONTIERS IN PSYCH., no. 1385, June 2020, at 1, 2 (finding
in a study where participants indicated no preference for one-sided or double-sided printing, the change
in default settings to double-sided printing resulted in a 15 percent reduction in paper use).
158. SUNSTEIN, supra note 151, at 70.
159. See Venema et al., supra note 157, at 2 (finding “nudges are specifically designed for people who
have adopted goals but fail to act upon them”). For example, “a prompt that encourages people to take the
stairs instead of the escalators should be effective for people who think they should be more active, but
not for people with walking disabilities.” Id.
160. SUNSTEIN, supra note 151, at 75.
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But leaving aside those concerns, it seems plausible that at least some
CMNs are means paternalist and are therefore compatible with this view of
autonomy. Returning to the RNTK case described in Part II.A, consider a nudge
that masks the choice of whether or not to receive actionable secondary genetic
findings.161 While most people would prefer to avoid becoming incurably ill,
when presented with a choice, some will elect not to receive these secondary
findings, even though it may not align with their values and they may not choose
to do so upon deeper reflection.162 Masking this choice, then, would lead more
people to receive secondary findings and would benefit most people. As long as
we can be confident that masking a choice will significantly decrease the chance
that people choose badly—that is, choose an option that will make them worse
off, as judged by themselves—then doing so might not disrespect autonomy. In
fact, according to some views, nudges could even turn out to be autonomy
enhancing.163 If autonomy is respected when people make choices that reflect
their own values—and since people sometimes predictably choose in ways that
do not promote their own values—then nudges could be considered autonomyenhancing if and when they help a nudgee choose in accordance with their own
values.164
This approach raises a number of questions, however; most notably
including how to respond to the minority of individuals on the tail end of the
curve who genuinely do not identify with the aims of the nudge.165 Is the fact that
a nudge is means paternalistic for most individuals enough for a nudge to be
considered means paternalistic overall? Even if there are some things that almost
everyone values, people vary tremendously in the trade-offs they are willing to
make. Taking this inevitable variation seriously should lead us to be skeptical
about the idea of a “one-size-fits-all” nudge that somehow manages to be
sensitive to this variation and steers people toward choices that facilitate them
getting what they really want.166 Exactly how is a choice architect able to access
this information about each person whose choice is affected by the nudge,
especially when they do not themselves have self-knowledge about what they
really want or what would really make them better off? These are deep and

161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. Varelius, supra note 156, at 382 (“Indeed, if others are more capable of getting the kind of results
that the person wants, the person who lets others make her own choices for her can thereby become even
more autonomous than she was to begin with.”).
164. See Mills, supra note 125, at 496–498 (defending nudges by appeal to autonomy enhancement);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L. J. 1, 39 (2014) [hereinafter Choosing Not
to Choose].
165. See Schupmann et al., supra note 29 (demonstrating that minority individuals genuinely do not
want to learn potentially lifesaving information).
166. See DiMatteo, supra note 106, at 301 (explaining that the reasonable person standard must be
established on a case-by-case basis).
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interesting questions, and they raise issues for many of the views of autonomy
discussed here. Our hope is that the acceptability conditions for CMNs that we
outline in Part VI help to answer them, at least for the nudges we aim to defend.167
This Part V described commonly held beliefs about the importance of
autonomy and argued that as long as CMNs do not intrude on protected identityforming spheres, they are compatible with respecting individual autonomy.
However, showing that compatibility is not yet enough to justify CMNs. Part VI
identifies the further features of CMNs that are necessary to make them
acceptable, particularly in the research context.
VI. NON-AUTONOMY ACCEPTABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHOICEMASKING NUDGES
While autonomy is an important consideration relevant to justifying the
kind of informational nudges we are primarily concerned with here, it is not the
only one.168 In this Part VI, we focus on four further considerations, all of which
must also be met for a CMN to be ethically acceptable.169 Acceptability comes
on a continuum, and nudges toward certain types of research—such as research
with vulnerable populations or research on ethically controversial topics such as
cloning—may need to satisfy especially stringent acceptability conditions.170
While the stringency of each consideration will vary with context, the following
four considerations give a rough indication of how acceptable any CMN is likely
to be. First, the nudge must be in the service of legitimate policy goals. Second,
the nudge must result in significantly more benefits than harms, overall. Third,
while nudges may have associated burdens, those burdens cannot be distributed
unfairly. And fourth, for a CMN to be acceptable, it must be better than other
feasible alternative ways of achieving the same goals. There are two components
to CMN acceptability: first, the nudge must not be objectionable on autonomy
grounds and second, it must satisfy the four considerations described below.

167. See supra Part VI.
168. See supra Part II. Non-autonomy concerns are especially important for choices that have
significant informational (as opposed to physical) components. See supra Part II.
169. See supra Part VI.
170. See Christine Grady et al., Broad Consent for Research with Biological Samples: Workshop
Conclusions, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34, 39–40 (2015) (discussing when broad consent is appropriate).
Certain topics may be so sensitive that they call for providing extra information with the nudge. Id. Doing
so is not a paradigmatic choice masking nudge and may reduce the extent to which a choice is masked.
Id.
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A. Legitimate Policy Goals:171
There are three levels on which a CMN policy goal can be legitimate:
individual, collective, and societal. The idea that health promotion has a special
status because of health’s fundamental role in furthering human activities colors
the discussion of CMNs policy goals at all levels.172 That important role, we
argue, is sufficient to ground a legitimate interest in promoting health—and, by
extension, medical research.173 First, on an individual level, it could be intended
to benefit nudgees since they, themselves would endorse or otherwise approve
of the underlying goal. Second, there is a broader collective basis of legitimacy
goals for CMNs; some policy goals might be worth pursuing even if not every
individual nudged by them would agree that the nudge makes them better off.
CMNs can be justified on a collective level when most individuals who will be
nudged agree with the goals that the nudge is intended to promote. Finally,
CMNs can be justified on a societal level when they lead to consequences that
benefit society or when they express important social values and attitudes.
Though all three levels can provide sufficient justification for a CMN, as one
gets further away from direct individual benefit, the threshold for justification
increases.
Policy goals that are legitimate because of expected individual benefit are
relatively straightforward to analyze. The most direct benefits from a CMN come
from encouraging research participants to make decisions that they otherwise
would not have made, and that have positive consequences.174 For example,
consider a participant who is nudged away from choosing to refuse secondary
findings and who as a result, learns that her genome sequence contains evidence
of high risk for Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon Cancer, which she later
develops.175 After receiving information about her hereditary risk, she would be
more likely to undergo enhanced routine screenings which would result in

171. Our arguments in this section respond to ethical rather than legally compelling interests. And
while we write of policy goals, we recognize that nudges will often be carried out by non-governmental
institutions.
172. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH 21 (2007) (explaining that health is of special moral
importance because it contributes to the range of opportunities open to us); see also Hafez Ismaili
M’hamdi, Neutrality and Perfectionism in Public Health, AM. J. BIOETHICS 31, 31 (2021) (advocating for
a defense of health policy as a legitimate state goal).
173. A CMN’s legitimate health interest plays a role similar to a state’s legitimate interest in the
rational basis test of judicial scrutiny. See Rational Basis Test, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test (last visited Jul. 26, 2021) (describing the Rational
Basis Test). For a state statute or ordinance to be shown to be constitutional, it is sufficient (as long as the
statute or ordinance does not infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights) to show that there is a
rational connection between the policy or ordinance and the state interests. Id. Similarly, since we have
excluded CMNs that infringe upon individuals’ identity-foundational commitments, showing that CMNs
are rationally related to health promotion should be sufficient to show their policy goals to be legitimate.
174. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
175. Berkman, supra note 28, at 7.
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detection and treatment of the cancer at an early stage.176 Without the genetic
indication, the cancer, which is difficult to detect with only normal
colonoscopies, would likely not be detected until a later and more fatal stage.177
Thus, the nudge could yield a direct benefit to the nudgee herself.
In these cases, a CMN can steer someone towards a potentially life-saving
decision that they otherwise might not have made but would have chosen if they
had all necessary information and were perfectly rational. This is not a
hypothetical concern: there is evidence that people regularly choose not to learn
about secondary findings without fully understanding what they are actually
refusing. Consider data from a recent empirical study on the RNTK in which a
large environmental health study asked 8,843 participants if they would like to
receive secondary genetic findings (“SFs”); 165 declined.178 In a later sub-study,
these “initial refusers” were given slightly more information about SFs and were
given another opportunity to make a decision.179 The results were stark,
indicating a sizeable group of “weak refusers”:
…almost half of participants who initially refused SFs subsequently
accepted them. By soliciting preferences through check boxes after an
accurate but limited presentation of information, it is likely that some
participants will make a choice that results in forgoing potentially lifesaving information that, upon further reflection, they would have
wanted to receive.180
The decision to give participants a choice about whether to accept SFs
introduced a risk: some participants might refuse to receive them. In such a
scenario, a CMN that defaults participants into receiving these findings would
mitigate that risk by guiding weak refusers towards a decision that is consistent
with their own preferences and interests.181
On a collective level, a CMN can be justified if it benefits most participants.
Benefits should be recognized and taken into consideration even when they
accrue to someone other than the individual being nudged, or when the
beneficiaries of the nudge cannot be directly identified. CMNs are carried out on

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Schupmann et al., supra note 29, at 2.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Nudging someone towards acceptance of important medical information is predicated on the
assumption that they could then take medical action to address the health concern. This assumes a baseline
level of access to medical care, which will not always be true in low resource settings, and which could
reduce the ability to justify a CMN. See, e.g., Haley K. Sullivan & Benjamin E. Berkman, Incidental
Findings in Low Resource Settings 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20 (2018) (arguing that incidental findings in
low resource settings are imperative for medically important results in genetic research). Nudging
someone towards acceptance of important medical information is predicated on the assumption that they
could then take medical action to address the health concern.
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an institutional level, not at the level of individual interactions.182 Thus, it will
often not be feasible to nudge only some members of a targeted group; a nudge
has the potential to affect the decisions of all who interact with it—those it will
benefit and those it will not. It is enough to show a benefit if implementation of
a CMN makes it more likely that most participants will act in accordance with
the nudge; it is not necessary that the nudge is beneficial from the perspective of
each individual being nudged. For instance, when we consider the RNTK case,
we see that, although most participants would prefer to avoid becoming incurably
ill, some participants might have principled reasons for deciding to opt-out of
receiving SFs. For example, some people might worry that documentation of a
potentially pathogenic genetic variant will make it harder for them to obtain
certain kinds of insurance (such as health, life, and long-term care). If it is not
possible to select only amenable nudgees, then applying the nudge to its intended
audience will also involve applying the nudge to individuals outside of its
intended audience.183 We argue that nudging individuals who would prefer not
to be nudged can be justified by the benefits that the nudge brings to others who
are amenable to the nudge.
On a societal level, nudges may have legitimate policy goals even when
nudgees do not have preferences about the goals (and would not, even if fully
informed), provided that the goals serve an important societal purpose.184 For
example, current genetic reference data skews heavily toward white individuals
of European ancestry.185 As a result, genetic research findings may be less
applicable to non-white individuals.186 If genetic reference data were more
broadly representative, it would have more value for more of the global
population. The social good of having a diverse bank of genetic reference data
could be a legitimate policy goal and justify a choice-masking nudge that urges
individuals to contribute to such reference data banks, even if donors of that
information are not likely to be directly benefited by the research it enables.
Many social goals that will be valuable to large groups of people, now or in the
future, do not directly benefit every individual who could help promote those
182. See Stuart Mills, The Future of Nudging Will Be Personal, BEHAV. SCIENTIST (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://behavioralscientist.org/the-future-of-nudging-will-be-personal/ (describing the different outcomes
of population-level nudges versus individual-level nudges).
183. Linda Thunstrom, Ben Gilbert & Chian Jones Ritten, Nudges that Hurt Those Already Hurting:
Distributional and Unintended Effects of Salience Nudges, INST. FOR PUB. RELS. (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://instituteforpr.org/nudges-that-hurt-those-already-hurting-distributional-and-unintended-effectsof-salience-nudges/.
184. See generally Muireann Quigley, Nudging for Health: On Public Policy and Designing Choice
Architecture, 21 MED. L. REV. 588 (2013) (describing how nudges can impact behavior to improve public
health).
185. See Giorgio Sirugo et al., The Missing Diversity in Human Genetic Studies, 177 CELL 26, 27
(2019) (finding in 2018, 78% of the individuals included in genome-wide association studies were of
European ancestry).
186. Id.
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goals. Important social goals are still legitimate to pursue, and we see no
principled reason why nudges cannot be used to promote them. When the
individuals being nudged do not have strong preferences about the policy goal
being promoted by the nudge, the societal legitimacy of the goal plays a greater
role in justifying the policy goal.187
Some people might worry that using legitimate policy goals as a
justification for paternalistic CMNs is a dangerous move that opens the door to
using CMNs in service of any frivolous policy aim that can be shown to be
means-paternalistic188 to most affected individuals or to promote a valid social
goal that people do not oppose. This concern shows that policy aims of CMNs
could become increasingly difficult to justify the farther away they move from
providing direct individual benefits.189 In response to these concerns, we
emphasize that legitimate policy goals are a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for acceptable nudges. The considerations described in the remainder
of this Part V deal with concerns about using nudges for trivial reasons.
B. The Benefits Outweigh the Harms
In assessing the balance of benefits and harms from a CMN, we are
interested in the direct and indirect effects on all people potentially impacted by
the nudge. In the previous section, we began outlining the idea that the
justificatory threshold will increase as the consequences of the nudge become
further removed from the nudged individual.190 For purposes of assessing
benefits and harms, consequences that accrue directly to the research participant
being nudged (the individual level) should be given the most weight. Broader
social benefits and harms (the societal level) should be given less weight to
reflect the less direct link between the nudgee’s decision and the ultimate goal,
and because any individual’s marginal contribution to the larger social project
will be less significant. Benefits and harms to third parties (the collective level)
will fall somewhere in between, and the weight in these cases will depend on
how direct the connection is between the CMN and the effect on the third-party.
For a nudge to be acceptable, the aggregate benefits—weighted by their
proximity to the individuals being nudged—must be greater than the similarly
weighted aggregate harms.191

187. See Venema et al., supra note 157, at 9 (finding that a “nudge is effective in guiding people’s
choices particularly when they do not know what to choose and that a nudge has the potential to reduce
uncertainty.”).
188. See supra Part V.D.
189. See supra Part V.D.
190. See supra Part VI.A.
191. See infra Part VI.C. (discussing burden distribution). Although, as we will discuss in the next
section, even if the harm/benefit calculus is favorable in the aggregate, harms also must not be distributed
unfairly. See infra Part VI.C.
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The various types of benefits that follow CMNs are described in the section
above as the bases for different levels of legitimate policy goals.192 If a particular
aspect of medical research can be reasonably expected to promote health
(individually, collectively, or societally), there is at least a presumptive
expectation that nudges that advance research have some important benefits.193
We are concerned here with potential CMN-related harms of three types:
economic, psychosocial, and harm to trust.194 While research suggests that the
importance of the former two concerns may be exaggerated, harm to trust in
medical research is concerning—both in itself and because of its potential impact
on health-seeking behavior and subsequent negative effects on health
outcomes.195 Complicating matters, the risk-benefit analysis becomes less certain
when examining contexts like NBS and GDS, where the CMN produces less
direct societal benefits.196 The marginal contribution of any individual sample or
data set will be minimal, but the aggregation of these resources can result in
substantial benefit.
A final category of harm that we will not discuss here is harm associated
with masking an important identity-foundational choice, whose forced selection
could significantly undermine a nudged research participant’s sense of self. Such
harms are unlikely to occur from choice-masking nudges that refrain from
nudging around sensitive identity-foundational areas, as we stipulate that CMNs
must.197 It is possible, however, that even nudges that avoid masking most
sensitive choices may have this kind of effect on a small number of participants.
That potential harm can be minimized by making the CMN resistible and by
flagging—as clearly as possible—the underlying conditions or beliefs that might
make a particular nudged option inappropriate. It is unlikely that nudges
satisfying all four acceptability considerations laid out in this Part VI will lead to
serious harms.
1. Economic and Psychosocial Harms
Economic and psychosocial harms are adverse consequences that should be
avoided, but we are skeptical that otherwise acceptable CMNs would likely lead
to serious harms of either kind. To illustrate potential economic and psychosocial
harms that could come from CMNs, consider the RNTK empirical study
192. See supra Part VI.A.
193. See Sze Lin Yoong et al., Nudge strategies to improve healthcare providers’ implementation of
evidence-based guidelines, policies and practices: a systematic review of trials included within Cochrane
systematic reviews, 15 IMPLEMENTATION SCI., July 2020, at 3 (stating that nudges “have been applied in
public health policy to change behaviour and support healthier lifestyle choices”).
194. We’re bracketing non-welfare harms, discussed elsewhere, and less relevant for an analysis of
tangible harms and benefits. See supra Part II.B.
195. See infra Part VI.B.1–2.
196. See infra Part II.B.C.
197. See supra Part V.
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mentioned above. While half of the initial refusers turned out to be “weak
refusers”, the other half of the study’s cohort continued to utilize the opt-out
mechanism.198 Given that these “strong refusers” dissented twice and had a high
level of understanding about the kinds of findings that could be returned to them,
it is clear that they have a durable preference not to know genetic information
about themselves.199 When assessing the benefit and harms of this CMN, the
question is whether “the potentially significant harms of patients or participants
misreporting their preferences on a consent form and forgoing valuable health
information outweighs the harms of not respecting the preferences of a handful
of strong refusers who do not opt-out.”200
In this case, economic harms could result from employers or insurers
making discriminatory decisions— such as the loss of a job or an inability to
acquire affordable health insurance—on the basis of an individual’s genetic
status.201 Psychosocial harms might include things like depression, anxiety, and
stigmatization.202 Though there has long been concern about harms associated
with genetic testing,203 these arguments have largely been based on hypothetical
concerns and have not been supported by emerging evidence.204 A
comprehensive review of the literature on psychosocial harms associated with
genetic testing concluded that current evidence suggests that:
[T]he original ELSI concerns were unfounded, exaggerated, or, at a
minimum, misdirected. At least in the contexts that have been most
studied, large negative impacts have not been found in the vast
majority of people studied.205
A similar story can be told about economic harms, where the Genetic
Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA)206 has served to mitigate most of
the concerns about genetic discrimination. Even in other contexts not covered by
GINA (such as long-term care and life-insurance), there remains little evidence
of widespread discrimination.207

198. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. Berkman, supra note 2828, at 5.
201. Id. at 60.
202. Id. at 56.
203. INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY
(Lori B. Andrews et. al. eds., 1994).
204. Berkman, supra note 28, at 56–59.
205. See Erik Parens & Paul Appelbaum, On What We Have Learned and Still Need to Learn about
the Psychosocial Impacts of Genetic Testing, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 2, 2 (2019) (introducing a special
journal issue devoted to critically analyzing the empirical literature in this field).
206. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881.
207. Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A Systematic Review of the
Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 25, 35 (2013).
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In summary, it appears that there are strong potential direct benefits to the
“weak refusers” and somewhat weaker benefits to their relatives. Though there
are hypothetical risks to “strong refusers”, there is scant evidence in the literature
to support these concerns.208 On net, we argue that the benefits of a CMN in the
context of the RNTK generally outweigh the harms. The value of providing some
participants with potentially life-saving information is very high, and the burden
of depriving a “strong refuser” of an explicit choice is low given that it is possible
for them to still opt-out if they feel strongly enough to independently raise the
issue with the researchers.
2. Harms to Trust and its Tangible Consequences
A more concerning harm potentially associated with CMNs is that nudging
could be viewed as duplicitous, and nudgees’ perceptions of being manipulated
might erode their trust in medical researchers.209 Harm to trust is concerning in
and of itself but could also have significant tangible consequences when lack of
trust in medical research develops into a general lack of trust in medical
institutions. The line between medical research and medical care is often blurry,
especially because some forms of medical care are only available in research
settings, such as experimental drugs for diseases with no known treatment.210 It
can be difficult to distinguish between being treated as a medical research
participant and being treated as a patient. As a result, loss of trust in medical
researchers may translate to loss in trust in medical institutions more broadly. If
CMNs are perceived as duplicitous by undermining nudgees’ trust in medical
institutions writ large, and if that causes those nudgees to be more hesitant in
seeking care and less likely to heed advice from their doctors, it could indirectly
contribute to worse health outcomes. This concern could arise for any individual,
but it may be particularly salient for members of groups who, because of
historical mistreatment, may have less trust and confidence in medical care and
research to begin with.211
Historical evidence suggests that lack of trust in medical establishments is
associated with significantly worse medical outcomes and with health

208. Berkman, supra note 28, at 56–60.
209. This analysis applies to feelings of being manipulated or deceived as well as to other psychosocial harms. Donald Wesson et al., Building Trust in Health Systems to Eliminate Health Disparities,
322 JAMA 111, 111 (2019). Such feelings are unpleasant in themselves but make it clearly into harm
territory when they negatively impact the researcher-participant relationship. Laura Specker Sullivan,
Trust, Risk, and Race in American Medicine, 50 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 18, 22 (2020).
210. Clinical Research Versus Medical Treatment, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/clinical-trials-what-patients-need-know/clinical-research-versus-medicaltreatment (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
211. Carly Parnitzke Smith, First, do no harm: institutional betrayal and trust in health care
organizations, 10 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY HEALTHCARE 133, 140–141 (2017).
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disparities.212 Some medical mistrust is linked to historical medical racism.213 In
addition to past examples of egregious medical misconduct, such as the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study,214 everyday experiences of medical racism are thought to
contribute to racialized medical mistrust.215 Disparities in care and personal
experiences of discrimination as well as the general mistrust of social institutions
also contribute to medical mistrust.216 CMNs could exacerbate problems of
medical mistrust if they are interpreted as a way for researchers to disrespectfully
avoid communication with research participants. To counteract such negative
effects, institutions must first take actions to prove themselves worthy of medical
trust. Beyond that, efforts to deliberately build trust and increase transparency
have proven essential to recruiting populations with a history of research abuse
to participate in subsequent medical research.217 A nudge that appears to mask
choice could be perceived as deceptive, and thus potentially in tension with trustbuilding recommendations.
Worries about medical mistrust are heightened when we have good reason
to believe that the CMN concerns a decision that provokes a variety of opinions.
In such cases, nudged endorsement of any option is likely to raise suspicions.
For example, there is extensive literature on public opinion about sharing
newborn blood spots and genomic data. While it is difficult to draw absolute
conclusions about public opinion, we do know that people’s views on the broad
sharing of genomic data are diverse and that there is at least a significant minority
of people who have strong views about the acceptability of broad data and sample

212. Wesson et al., supra note 209, at 111.
213. See LAURA SPECKER SULLIVAN, TRUST, RISK, AND RACE IN AMERICAN MEDICINE, 50 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 18 (2020) (providing an overview of the relationship between racism and trust in the American
medical system).
214. See, Marcella Alsan et al., The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis: A Case Study in Peripheral
Trauma with Implications for Health Professionals, 35 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 322, 323 (2019)
(discussing medical misconduct that occurred during The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and its contribution
to medical mistrust in the community).
215. Simar Bajaj & Fatima Stanford, Beyond Tuskegee: Vaccine Distrust and Everyday Racism, 384
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1,1 (2021).
216. Dwayne Brandon et al., The Legacy of Tuskegee and Trust in Medical Care: Is Tuskegee
Responsible for Race Differences in Mistrust of Medical Care?, 97 JAMA 951, 951, 954–55 (2005).
217. Monica Skewes et al., Health Disparities Research with American Indian Communities: The
Importance of Trust and Transparency 66 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCH. 302, 303 (2020).
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sharing.218 Data on views about NBS research is similar.219 Given the range of
perspectives on NBS research and GDS, it is reasonable to exercise caution about
endorsing a CMN model.220 In fact, recognizing the uncertainty in the public
polling data, the GDS policy explicitly prohibits an opt-out approach (although
as discussed above, the policy does seem to leave room for some strategies that
look CMN adjacent).221 Despite a similarly diverse range of views on the sharing
of bloodspots, state-level NBS policies still largely include a CMN approach.222
Refraining from CMNs in an effort to improve transparency and build trust
might appear to be in tension with the purpose of implementing CMNs to receive
the associated benefits. Potential nudgers therefore face a challenge: they must
implement CMNs in an effective, yet also transparent and respectful way. The
degree to which relevant information must be provided and questions invited will
depend on the sensitivity of the choice being masked and the historical levels of
distrust among research participant groups—the greater the likelihood of the
nudge causing distrust, the greater the need for transparency.223 For instance,
researchers violated the trust of Havasupai Tribe members—who initially
consented to participate in a diabetes research study that was expected to
generate research benefits—by using their stored blood samples without their
consent for genetic testing that discredited cultural creation myths in a way that
was deeply offensive to many of the Havasupai.224 Nudging members of the
218. See supra Part I.B.C. One meta-analysis of 51 empirical publications found that strong majorities
of people were willing to provide broad one-time consent to have their genomic data shared in a research
repository. Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, A Systematic Literature Review of Individuals’ Perspectives on Broad
Consent and Data Sharing in the United States, 18 GENET. MED. 663, 666–67 (2016). However, when
given a choice between broad, study-specific, or categorical consent, the percentage of people endorsing
broad consent dropped significantly. Id.; Jodyn Platt et al., Public Preferences Regarding Informed
Consent Models for Participation in Population-based Genomic Research, 16 GENET. MED. 11, 11, 17,
19 (2014); Tom Tomlinson et al., Moral Concerns and the Willingness to Donate to a Research Biobank,
313 JAMA 417, 418 (2015). Some studies even indicate strong support for study-specific consent. David
J Kaufman et al., Public Opinion about the Importance of Privacy in Biobank Research, 85 AM. J. HUM.
GENET. 643, 650 (2009). Confusing matters even more, some studies found majority support for opt-in
approaches, but other studies found majority endorsement for opt-out approaches that look closer to
CMNs. Garrison, supra note 218.
219. One study found that 72% of parents wanted to give specific consent each time their child’s
bloodspot was going to be used. Daniel Thiel et al., Community Perspectives on Public Health
Biobanking: An Analysis of Community Meetings on the Michigan BioTrust for Health, 5 J. CMTY.
GENETICS 125, 132 (2014). In contrast, a different study found that 55% of parents wanted an opt-out
model. Debra Duquette et al., Michigan BioTrust for Health: public support for using residual dried blood
spot samples for health research, 15 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 146, 151 (2012).
220. See supra Part II.B.C.
221. See supra Part II.C.
222. See ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS., ISSUE BRIEF: INFORMED CONSENT FOR
NEWBORN SCREENING RESEARCH (2015) (showing that most states do not require explicit consent to
conduct research with newborn blood spots).
223. Christina M. Pacheco et al., Moving Forward: Breaking the Cycle of Mistrust between American
Indians and Researchers, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2152, 2153 (2013).
224. Id. at 2159.
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Havasupai Tribe to give blood samples could warrant greater transparency and
communication efforts than would be required in nudging the general population
of new parents—who have not had such negative experiences with research
misconduct—to participate in NBS. Though more transparent nudges might be
less effective, the tradeoff would be justified in the aforementioned case. The
extent to which perceived duplicity from choice-masking is likely to have
harmful consequences depends on past relationships between nudgers and
nudgees, as well as the sensitivity of the content of the nudge.
A. Unfair Distribution of CMN Burdens
Another important consideration in evaluating CMNs is whether their
burdens are distributed unfairly. CMNs are most likely to impose a burden when
participants have difficulty opting out of a default option they would prefer not
to receive.225 This unfair distribution of resistibility may occur at the individual
or the group level. On the individual level, it would be unfair to impose an
extreme burden on a research participant solely for the purpose of lessening a
benefit to others.226 Nudges can be considered unfairly distributed on the group
level when the individual characteristics that make resisting nudges difficult fall
along group lines or are related to group membership.227 Unfair distribution of
nudging effects along group lines is especially concerning because it has the
potential to exacerbate underlying social injustices, particularly if the distribution
disadvantages already disadvantaged groups. If it is harder for some nudgees to
resist a nudge than others, it would be especially unfair if those who had the most
difficulty resisting the nudge also belong to a disadvantaged group in society.228
There are two reasons we might worry about unfairly distributing nudge
burdens along group lines. First, nudges could concentrate burdens or harms in
certain groups without providing benefits to members of the same group. This
might be the case, for example, if a CMN—today—nudged members of the
Havasupai Tribe to donate genetic samples to be used in research unlikely to
benefit the donors.229 Given historical conflicts, such a nudge could do serious
damage to group trust in medical institutions. Second, CMNs might be less
resistible to some groups than to others. Even if opt-out mechanisms are easy
and readily available, the nature of the CMN requires that participants self225. See infra Part VI.C.
226. See, e.g., JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 135 (1992); See SCANLON, supra
note 109, at 235 (arguing that one should be saved from serious pain and injury at the cost of
inconveniencing others or interfering with their amusement).
227. See Daniel Hausman, Protecting Groups from Genetic Research, 22 BIOETHICS 157, 159 (2008)
(describing group harms as something that individuals face because of their group membership).
228. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75, 75–78 (1971) (discussing the similar idea that
inequalities should bring the most benefits to the least advantaged members of society, in context of his
difference principle).
229. See Pacheco et al., supra note 223223, at 2154 (providing an overview of the Havasupai case).
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identify as choosing to opt-out of it.230 The option is only available to those who
actively select it, which involves articulating one’s preferences, seemingly
contradicting the research team’s preferences.231 Members of groups with
cultural values that emphasize deference to authority, groups with low literacy,
or members of groups that are generally socially vulnerable may feel less
confident in articulating their concerns or desire to activate the opt-out process.
At the same time, it is important to ask why individuals might want to resist
a given nudge. Members of groups who have difficulty resisting a nudge may
also have more to lose from resisting. For example, in a recent paper, Mrkva and
colleagues suggest that well-implemented nudges can be used to reduce choice
disparities.232 Through a series of studies, they show that individuals with lowsocioeconomic status were more impacted by nudges than those with highsocioeconomic status, and that individuals with lower levels of domain
knowledge and numeracy were more impacted by nudges than individuals with
high levels of domain knowledge and numeracy.233 These findings suggest that
carefully constructed nudges that benefit low-socioeconomic status individuals
help to reduce inequalities and promote equity. If the nudge is legitimate and
beneficial overall, it might be more unfair not to nudge than it would be to nudge.
This consideration might depend, to some extent, on whether the nudge is
paternalistic or justified by appealing to society, generally. Means-paternalistic
nudges are designed to offset potential disproportionate burdens with benefits to
the nudgees on their own terms.234 Thus, it is more important that nudges justified
by their contribution to the social good are shown to not be unfair than it is for
means-paternalistic nudges that promote a nudgee’s own interests.235 At any rate,
nudgers must be especially aware that individuals belonging to vulnerable social
groups may be less likely to self-identify as having non-default preferences and
should, as a result, avoid designing nudges that would take advantage of that
dynamic.
B. Lack of Ethically Superior Feasible Alternatives
Instances of paternalism—even justified and resistible ones, as any nudge
that satisfies the three considerations listed above will be—should be taken
seriously since they involve acting on behalf of other people. Nudges are
intended to be effective and should therefore, at least to some degree, restrict the

230. See infra Part VI.C.
231. Why an opt-out rather than an opt-in or consent?, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT DATA,
https://understandingpatientdata.org.uk/news/why-an-opt-out (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
232. Kellen Mrvka et al., Do Nudges Reduce Disparities? Choice Architecture Compensates for Low
Consumer Knowledge, 85 J. OF MKTG. 67, 80–81 (2021).
233. Id. at 73.
234. See supra Part III.
235. See supra Part III.
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nudgee’s scope of self-determination. To justify the use of a CMN, the researcher
must show that there are not feasible effective alternatives to achieve a nudge’s
given aim.236 While comparison with feasible alternatives must ultimately be
done on a case-by-case basis, cognitive biases are strong indicators of a lack of
feasible alternatives.
1. Counteracting Cognitive Biases
Nudges will often be the best feasible way to achieve a desired outcome
when they address decisions in which choosers are likely to be affected by
cognitive biases because cognitive biases often prevent people from rationally
pursuing what they would prefer in light of their considered beliefs, attitudes,
and preferences. In a decision that requires careful deliberation, someone might
display cognitive bias by becoming frustrated and choosing rashly without
attempting to consider all available options; nudges can counteract that effect.
Not all kinds of choices are equally subject to cognitive biases. Typically, the
greater the likelihood of a decision inducing cognitive bias, the more justified a
nudge will be.237 The emotionally charged nature of medical decision-making is
likely to contribute to cognitive bias.238 A decision-maker’s emotions often
affects her choice, particularly if the choice will have effects far into the future.239
Research has shown, for example, that when choosers feel stressed by the
decision they are asked to make, they tend to unwittingly overestimate how long
they will feel that way and decide differently than they would in a calmer state.240
What is at stake in a particular decision also has implications for how much
cognitive bias is likely to enter into the choice. It has been suggested that in very
low stakes decisions, choosers might experience low processing motivation and
consequently select the most convenient option without careful consideration.241
At the same time, very high stakes decisions might also induce cognitive bias
because they can be overwhelming and make reasonable deliberation very

236. Perhaps the most common objection to CMNs is to ask why individuals should be nudged into
making better choices instead of being educated and enabled to make better choices for themselves. While
education might promote autonomy more than nudging, that kind of education is not always effective or
feasible. See supra Part V.
237. Bart Engelen, Nudging and rationality: What is there to worry?, 31 RATIONALITY AND SOC’Y
204, 205 (2019) (explaining how nudges tap into heuristics and biases).
238. Pat Croskerry, From Mindless to Mindful Practice—Cognitive Bias and Clinical Decision
Making, 368 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2445, 2447 (2013).
239. George Lowenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK
OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619–21 (R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer & H.H. Goldsmith eds., 2003).
240. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Hot–Cold Empathy Gaps and Medical Decision Making, 24
HEALTH PSYCH. 49, 59 (2005) (discussing how individuals have difficulty estimating their own behavior
and preferences across affective states).
241. Engelen, supra note 5, at 55.
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difficult.242 Nudges are more likely to outperform feasible alternatives in highly
emotionally charged situations and when decision stakes are particularly high or
low.243
Returning to our cases, an excellent example of cognitive biases can be
found in the RNTK debate. There is extensive psychological literature about
individuals’ poor ability to predict how future negative events will impact our
emotional wellbeing.244 This affective forecasting literature suggests that while
people think that future unfortunate events will be devastating, most humans are
actually more emotionally resilient than we realize and we have the ability to
adapt to even terrible news.245 This is particularly true in the context of genetic
testing, where most reactions to unfavorable information are mild and
transient.246 This kind of widespread cognitive bias might be used to support
implementation of a CMN. In contrast, consider the cognitive biases inherent in
the way that consent is obtained for NBS. The typical procedure is to ask new
parents, in the days after giving birth, to review a stack of paperwork, including
the notification that they can opt out of allowing their child’s bloodspot to be
used for future research.247 This chaotic time might not be an ideal moment to
implement a CMN because the parents’ ability to cognitively engage and
deliberate might be compromised.
2. Least Restrictive Alternative
Stakes and emotional valence can, at best, give a rough indication of
whether a CMN is likely to be better than feasible alternatives, however. To make
that determination in specific cases, it is necessary to directly compare
alternatives in terms of their relative harms and benefits. This comparison can be
done with the widely used less restrictive alternatives (LRA) test, which
compares a proposal to alternatives along two dimensions: restrictiveness and

242. Monica E. Lemmon & Peter A. Ubel, In Defense of Nudging When the Stakes Are High, 19 AM.
J. BIOETHICS 62, 62–63 (2019).
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Elisabeth W. Dunn & Simon M. Laham, Affective Forecasting: A User’s Guide to
Emotional Time Travel, in AFFECT IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 177, 177–178 (Joseph P. Forgas
ed., 2006); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in 35 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCH. 345, 346, 401 (James M. Olson & Mark P. Zanna eds., 2003) (discussing
impact bias’s effect on one’s ability to accurately predict how future events will impact one’s wellbeing).
245. Id.
246. See S.A. Peters et al., The Future in Clinical Genetics: Affective Forecasting Biases in Patient
and Clinician Decision Making, 85 CLINICAL GENETICS 312, 313–14 (2014) (discussing research showing
that individuals overestimate the negativity of psychological outcomes of predictive genetic testing); see
also Marita Broadstock et al., Psychological Consequences of Predictive Genetics Testing: A Systematic
Review, EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 731, 731, 735 (2000) (reporting studies showing no evidence of high
levels of, nor increases in, emotional distress after predictive genetic testing).
247. See supra Part I.B.
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effectiveness.248 In the case of CMNs, restrictiveness measures how harmful the
nudge would likely be and effectiveness measures how likely it is to achieve its
aims.249 The test is easy to use when one alternative is dominant—meaning that
it is both more effective and less restrictive. When no alternative under
comparison is superior on both axes—such as when the nudge is more effective
but slightly more restrictive—there is no shortcut to careful deliberation and
weighing of alternatives. Restrictiveness should only be tolerated if the
effectiveness is far greater, but harms to autonomy and social justice put a limit
on the level of restrictiveness that can be tolerated.
To illustrate this kind of analysis, consider different alternatives to a CMN
in the context of the RNTK. As one alternative, investigators could include more
detail in the consent form about the kinds of secondary findings that might be
discovered, thinking that this could increase understanding. Such a proposition
would have to be tested, however, because there is extensive literature that calls
into question participants’ ability to engage with and internalize basic concepts
being conveyed in consent forms.250 Another alternative might be to schedule a
dedicated conversation with a genetics counselor about the RNTK. However, this
would be prohibitively resource intensive and might not even be feasible given
the well-documented shortage of genetic counselors.251 A final option would be
to recontact participants who refused secondary findings to give them another
chance to make a choice. This option, however, risks alerting those who really
did not want to know about the existence of a positive secondary finding. Given
these options, it seems reasonable to conclude that a CMN is the best option,
assuming that there is a mechanism for self-identified refusers to easily opt-out.
An analysis of LRAs becomes more complicated in situations where there
is only societal benefit—like the NBS and GDS cases—involving a two-step
assessment of how much scientific value is lost when you switch from a CMN
to an explicit opt-out mechanism. This will first typically require an empirical
analysis of the difference in size and composition of the research resource under
a CMN and other consent strategies. For instance, how many fewer people (and
which ones) will not agree to give their sample for future research if explicitly
asked? It then becomes important to ask whether that lost value significantly
undermines the research goals. For example, if researchers want to create a
genomic database to study common conditions, losing a small portion of a
248. C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 929
(2016).
249. Id.
250. See Amulya Mandava et al., The Quality of Informed Consent: Mapping the Landscape. A Review
of Empirical Data from Developing and Developed Countries, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 356, 356–57 (2012)
(discussing reasons why some patients have difficulty understanding concepts conveyed in consent forms,
such as lack of formal education and experience with biomedical research and consent procedures).
251. See NAT’L SOC’Y OF GENETIC COUNS., 2021 PROFESSIONAL STATUS SURVEY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2021) (illustrating that there are many states with just a few genetic counselors).
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repository might not be deleterious unless those losses came from a group of
particular interest. A research resource being used to study rare diseases or
variants might have more scientific justification to maximize the size and
representativeness of the repository.
VII. CONCLUSION
Effective use of CMNs in medical research has the potential to benefit
individuals in ways they themselves endorse, to help people collectively, and to
promote important social objectives.252 For the kind of purely informational
nudges we are concerned with here, the benefits extend beyond the individuals
being nudged; our basis for justifying CMNs thus extends beyond individuals to
consider collective and societal benefit. As our examples of the RNTK genetic
information about oneself, NBS, and GDS all show, these benefits are not merely
hypothetical.253 But neither are their costs. While CMNs have great potential
positive effects, they could also transgress individuals’ autonomy interests. If
medical researchers are to use CMNs, it is important that they do so in legally
and ethically acceptable ways. Thus, the challenge facing researchers is to design
nudges that are likely to be effective overall, but that are also easily resistible to
those who wish to resist.254 Where the sweet spot is when soliciting questions
without raising concerns will depend on the context of a particular nudge. The
primary aim of this paper has been to provide a framework for designing
acceptable CMNs that capture the potential benefits without incurring the
potential costs.
Our analysis of the reasonable person standard and United States federal
research regulations shows how CMNs fit into current legal regulations.255
Research regulations require medical researchers to provide participants with
enough information so that participants understand the research they intend to
participate in, but do not require explicit choice.256 Importantly, they refer to the
reasonable person standard to determine what counts as sufficient.257 The
structure of the RPS helps us see how reasonableness is evaluated by directing
us to consider all relevant considerations and weigh them in a reasonable way.258
For the medical research questions that we are interested in, a reasonable person
would weigh her interests in having a full range of choices explicitly presented
against how both she and others are likely to be affected by the nudge. CMNs

252. See supra Part V.
253. See supra Part II.
254. See supra Part III.
255. See supra Part IV.
256. Umesh Chandra Gupta, Informed consent in clinical research: Revisiting few concepts and areas,
4 PERSPS. IN CLINICAL RSCH. 26, 27 (2013).
257. Mazur, supra note 94.
258. Id.
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that respect protected autonomy domains and conform to the considerations
discussed in Part VI of this article are expected to be acceptable to reasonable
persons.259
We expect legally and ethically acceptable CMNs to have legitimate policy
aims, generate more benefits than harms, not unfairly distribute burdens, and lack
feasible alternatives. The stringency of our acceptability considerations,
however, will vary with the context. In some cases, historical facts might make
a certain choice particularly sensitive and render masking inappropriate,260
Moreover, significantly more masking may be acceptable when benefits are
likely to accrue directly to the individual being nudged. There is precedent for
this kind of sliding scale of acceptability.261 Our acceptability considerations for
CMNs are similarly responsive to the social and historical context of the choice,
the directness of the (positive and negative) consequences likely to accrue to
research participants, and the degree of ethical controversy surrounding the
nudge. Return once more to the RNTK example. While a nudge toward receiving
medically actionable secondary findings would likely be appropriate in most
contexts, it would not be in all contexts.262
The most likely challenges to CMNs come from critics who claim that
CMNs are likely to violate fundamental autonomy interests. While we
acknowledge that CMNs may not be welcome on every view of autonomy, they
are compatible with the most important features of autonomy; nudged research
participants can still be the driving forces of their own lives. The easy resistibility
built in to acceptable CMNs undermines objections that CMNs would force
research participants into unwillingly and unwittingly accepting researchers’
default decisions. Medical research is complicated and can be difficult for
participants to understand; thoughtfully designed CMNs have an important role
to play in gently helping large numbers of research participants reach decision
outcomes that really are best for them and their communities.

259. See supra Part VI.
260. See supra Part VI.B.2–V.C.
261. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that resolution of due process
“requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the Government’s
interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures would entail”). Consider, as an analogy, how numerous court rulings have asserted
that the requirements of due process vary with context and respond to a complex set of the individuals’
interests likely to be affected, the government’s legitimate interests in its official action, and risks of likely
harms to those interests. Id.
262. Pacheco et al., supra note 223. For research with communities who have previously had their
genetic information used in ways they neither consented nor approved of, such as the Havasupai people
in Arizona, such a nudge could be perceived as disrespectful or insensitive, and strain researchercommunity relationships. Id. at 2154.

